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Abstract:
This article investigates the values and latent policies in the area of the
availability of specific performance (SP) as a contractual remedy, which have
shaped the development of Chinese law. The National People’s Congress
(Legislature) and Supreme People’s Court in China have addressed the remedial
structure of Chinese contract law, namely, the availability of the remedy of SP as
opposed to the awarding of damages only. The law is clear that the remedies of
SP and damages are ordinary remedies that a claimant is free to choose between.
The question that this article confronts is whether in practice the equality of SP
and damages as remedies are applied in a neutral, unbiased way by the Chinese
courts. Simply put, how often do Chinese courts use SP as a remedy for contract
breaches? If SP is seldom awarded, the question then becomes: what are the
underlying reasons or rationales given for its underutilization? This article
employs an empirical study based on data collected by surveys and follow-up
interviews with hundreds of Mainland Chinese judges at various levels of the
Chinese court system (related to civil and commercial disputes). Based on the
statistical findings of the empirical study, a theoretical inquiry is offered to better
understand the relative use or non-use of specific performance as a contractual
remedy. The findings show that damages are often favored over SP; additionally,
judges in the Mainland Chinese court system take a far more proactive role in the
preliminary stages of trials and will actively persuade parties to claim damages
over specific performance where expedient. The study also shows that, despite
popular belief, the higher supervision costs associated with specific performance
are not a determinative factor in the decision not to award SP.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The fundamental contractual obligation is to deliver the promised
performance. A specific performance (SP) remedy is a court order that
compels a breaching-party to fulfill its contractual promise.1 The alternative
to the issuance of an SP order is the granting of compensatory damages.2
Comparative studies have shown that while the common law world favors
awarding damages over ordering SP, civil law systems endorse SP, at least
in principle. In the civil law, SP is seen as a primary remedy equivalent to
the remedy of damages.3 Doctrinally, Chinese law adopts the civil law
approach in not prioritizing damages over specific performance.4
Alternatively stated, the common law sees equitable remedies, such as
SP, injunction, rescission, and reformation, as extraordinary remedies to be
given when the legal remedy of damages does not provide adequate redress.5
1
Amy H. Kastely, The Right to Require Performance in International Sales: Towards
an International Interpretation of the Vienna Convention, 63 WASH. L. REV. 607, 632 (1988)
(“Under Anglo-American law, specific performance refers to a judicial order requiring the
performance of a party’s contractual obligations.”).
2
It should be noted that the non-breaching party might claim damages along with a SP
order, for incidental damages mostly related to the delay in performance. The damages are not
technically compensatory in nature since the non-breaching party’s harm is rectified by actual
performance.
3
Ronald J. Scalise Jr., Why No “Efficient Breach” in the Civil Law?: A Comparative
Assessment of the Doctrine of Efficient Breach of Contract, 55 AM. J. COMP. L. 721, 726-33
(2007); Henrik Lando & Caspar Rose, On the enforcement of specific performance in Civil
Law countries, 24 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 473 (2004); PRINCIPLES, DEFINITIONS AND MODEL
RULES OF EUROPEAN PRIVATE LAW: DRAFT COMMON FRAME OF REFERENCE (DCFR) FULL
EDITION, 825 (Christian von Bar & Eric Clive eds., 2010) 825; PRINCIPLES OF EUROPEAN
CONTRACT LAW: PARTS I AND II (Ole Lando & Hugh Beale eds., 2000); Lucinda Miller,
Specific Performance in the Common and Civil Law: Some Lessons for Harmonisation, in REEXAMINING CONTRACT AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT: ANGLO-CANADIAN PERSPECTIVES 288-89
(Paula Giliker ed., 2007).
4
Article 107 of the Chinese Contract Law reads: “If a party fails to perform its
obligations under a contract, or its performance fails to satisfy the terms of the contract, it shall
bear the liabilities for breach of contract such as to continue to perform its obligations, to take
remedial measures, or to compensate for losses.” Contract Law of the People’s Republic of
China (Adopted at the Second Session of the Ninth National People’s Congress on Mar. 15,
1999 and promulgated by Order No. 15 of the President of the People’s Republic of China on
Mar. 15, 1999) [hereinafter CCL]. Some scholars argue that specific performance takes
precedence in the hierarchy of remedies since specific performance was spelled out first in the
provision. See WANG LI MING, STUDY ON CONTRACT LAW 557 (2011). Others maintain that
there is no hierarchical difference between damages and specific performance given the fact
that both appear in the same sentence. See THE LAW OF CONTRACT 316 (Jianyuan Cui ed., 3d
ed. 2010); SHIYUAN HAN, THE LAW OF CONTRACT 547 (4th ed. 2018). While specific
performance is not expressly stated to be a primary remedy in China, it is, as a matter of
principle, generally available as an option for aggrieved parties.
5
See DOUGLAS LAYCOCK, MODERN AMERICAN REMEDIES: CASES AND MATERIALS 380
(4th ed. 2010) (“It is hornbook law that equity will not act if there is an adequate remedy at
law.”); Javierre v. Central Altagracia, 217 U.S. 502, 508 (1910) (“[A] suit for damages would
have given adequate relief, and therefore the appellee should have been confined to its remedy
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SP is only given where the subject matter of the contract is considered to be
unique, such as in the sale of works of art, or more commonly, the sale of
real estate. In sale-of-goods transactions, the subject matter is considered to
be fungible; therefore, legal damages are easily calculable by using the price
differentials between the contract price and the market price, or the contract
price and the price of substituted goods.6
There is rather deep
comparative law literature comparing the role of SP in the civil and common
laws,7 but that literature is conceptual in nature, while this article pursues an
empirical methodology. Part II briefly examines the debate over SP as an
ordinary remedy in American legal scholarship, as well as the divergence
between the civil and common laws on the subject. It discusses the
proposition that the divergence, despite the counterpoise in black letter law,
is not as great as it seems on the surface. It also focuses on the different
viewpoints on the subject in common law scholarship, along with the trend
towards a more expansive use of SP in the common law. The second section
discusses the divergence between the formal civil law rules as written versus
as applied by the courts, to show that SP is more frugally used than is
commonly understood in legal scholarship. Part III briefly examines the
evolution of Chinese contract law and its use of SP. Part IV examines the
design and findings of an empirical study of Chinese judges on their feelings
and use of SP. Part V offers a descriptive theory of remedies in order to better
frame the use of SP in practice, while Part VI provides a normative theory of
SP based upon the norms of efficiency and fairness.

at law”).
6
U.C.C. § 2-712(2) provides that, in cases where the buyer purchases substituted goods,
it “may recover from the seller as damages the difference between the cost of cover and the
contract price”; U.C.C. § 2-713(1) provides that, in cases of non-delivery or repudiation, “the
measure of damages for non-delivery or repudiation by the seller is the difference between the
market price at the time when the buyer learned of the breach”. See U.C.C. §§ 2-712, 2-713
(AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2010). Article 75 of the U.N. Convention on Contracts
for the International Sale of Goods provides that “the party claiming damages may recover the
difference between the contract price and the price in the substitute transaction . . .” U.N.
Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods art. 75, Mar. 2, 1987, S. TREATY
DOC. NO. 98-9 (1983), 1489 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter CISG]. CISG Article 76 provides that
“the party claiming damages may, if he has not made a purchase . . . recover the difference
between the price fixed by the contract and the current price at the time of avoidance.” Id. at
art. 76.
7
See John P. Dawson, Specific Performance in France and Germany, 57 MICH. L. REV.
495 (1959) (tracing the development of the specific performance idea in Roman Law,
classical, post-classical and medieval law); Shael Herman, Specific Performance: a
Comparative Analysis (1), 7 EDINBURGH L. REV. 6 (2003); Guenter Treitel, Remedies for
Breach of Contract, in INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF COMPARATIVE LAW, 155 (Arthur
von Mehren ed., 1976); Gerard De Vries, Right to Specific Performance: Is There a
Divergence between Civil- and Common-Law Systems and, If So, How Has It Been Bridged
in the DCFR?, 4 EUR. REV. PVT. L. 581 (2009).
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II. DAMAGES-SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE DEBATE
Michel Cannarsa has attributed the divergence in civil and common law
in the remedial area to the larger role that the morality of promise8 plays in
the civil law system. He states that “[t]his divergence is attributed to the
‘moral dimension’ of the contractual commitment in civil law jurisdictions.
The one who does not perform his contractual obligations is seen as
breaching a moral commitment and is therefore forced, by the courts, to keep
his commitment.”9 In contrast, the common law sees SP as an inefficient
remedy when damages are determined to be sufficient to fully compensate
the non-breaching party.10 Thus, SP is reserved as an extraordinary remedy
for cases where the subject matter of the contract is deemed to be unique.
The divergence between the civil and common laws in the area of
remedies (SP as an ordinary or extraordinary remedy) is, like most of the
well-recognized divergences between the two legal systems, an
oversimplification. Lando and Rose showed in an empirical study that
although the civil and common law treat the availability of SP differently, in
practice, they have reached similar results or outcomes as to when SP is to
be granted.11 This convergence theory states that, in practice, there is less
difference between common and civil law systems than the doctrinal
statement of law might suggest.12
8
The morality of promise has seen some revised interest in American scholarship. See
CHARLES FRIED, CONTRACT AS PROMISE: A THEORY OF CONTRACTUAL OBLIGATION 14-16
(1981); Seana Valentine Shiffrin, The Divergence of Contract and Promise, 120 HARV. L.
REV. 708, 722 (2007); Jody S. Kraus, The Correspondence of Contract and Promise, 109
COLUM. L. REV. 1603 (2009).
9
Michel Cannarsa, Chinese Contract Law on Remedies and Damages: A Civil Law
Perspective, in CHINESE CONTRACT LAW: CIVIL AND COMMON LAW PERSPECTIVES 410-11
(Larry A. DiMatteo & Lei Chen eds., 2018). The morality of specific performance is also
found in American legal scholarship. See FRIED, supra note 8, at 16; Randy E. Barnett,
Contract Remedies and Inalienable Rights, in SOCIAL PHILOSOPHY & POLICY 179-83 (Ellen
Frankel Paul ed., 1986); Daniel Friedmann, The Efficient Breach Fallacy, 18 J. LEGAL STUD.
1, 13-14 (1989); Daniel Friedmann, Economic Aspects of Damages and Specific Performance
Compared, in CONTRACT DAMAGES: DOMESTIC AND INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES 65
(Djakhongir Saidov & Ralph Cunnington eds., 2008); Peter Linzer, On the Amorality of
Contract Remedies— Efficiency, Equity, and the Second Restatement, 81 COLUM. L. REV. 111,
138 (1981).
10 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 359(1) (1981) (“[S]pecific performance
. . . will not be ordered if damages would be adequate to protect the expectation interest of the
injured party.”) (Comment a. states that: “Adequacy is to some extent relative, and the modern
approach is to compare remedies to determine which is more effective in serving the ends of
justice.”).
11 Lando & Rose, supra note 3, at 473 (arguing that despite black letter law recognizing
SP as an ordinary remedy, it is rarely used in many civil law countries). “[E]mpirical
observation is that specific performance is not enforced in Denmark for production contracts
. . . In Germany and France, while enforced (although with many exceptions), claims for
specific performance are rare.” Id. at 480.
12 Id. at 474 (“Alternatively, it may be argued that specific performance is not, in practice,
the routine contract remedy in Civil Law countries. Some scholars note a trend toward
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The common law has in-depth legal literature discussing the proper use
of specific performance vis-à-vis the awarding of damages. Lord Hoffmann
proclaimed that: “there is less difference between common law and civilian
systems than these general statements might lead one to suppose.”13 He
maintains that “judges [in civil and common law systems] take much the
same matters into account in deciding whether [SP] would be inappropriate
in a particular case.”14 Allan Farnsworth sees a trend in American law where
SP has been used in areas traditionally covered by an award of damages.15
A. The Common Law Debate
The common law views the payment of compensatory damages as
satisfying the breaching party’s contractual obligations. In the immortal
words in his 1897 seminal article, The Path of the Law, Chief Justice Oliver
Wendell Holmes Jr. stated that:
Nowhere is the confusion between legal and moral ideas more
manifest than in the law of contract. Among other things, here again
the so-called primary rights and duties are invested with a mystic
significance beyond what can be assigned and explained. The duty to
keep a contract at common law means a prediction that you must pay
damages if you do not keep it, and nothing more.16

More recently, other American scholars have argued that the awarding
of compensatory damages for breach of contract is a more efficient remedy.17
convergence in contract remedies in Civil and Common Law countries.”). Steven Shavell,
Specific Performance Versus Damages for Breach of Contract: An Economic Analysis, 84
TEX. L. REV. 831, 869 (2006).
13 Co-operative Insurance Society Ltd. v. Argyll Stores (Holdings) Ltd. [1998] AC 1 (HL)
11 (appeal taken from AC).
14 Id. at 11-12.
15 E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS 854 (2d ed. 1990). Farnsworth asserts that:
“Nevertheless, the modern trend is clearly in favor of the extension of specific relief at the
expense of the traditional primacy of damages.” Id.
16 Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 462 (1897).
17 E.g., Anthony T. Kronman, Specific Performance, 45 U. CHI. L. REV. 351, 369 (1978)
(arguing for the efficiency of the common law distinction unique versus fungible goods and,
therefore, specific performance is only warranted in cases involving unique items:
“[P]romisors and promisees will typically favor a money damages rule if the subject matter of
their contract is not unique.”); Theodore Eisenberg & Geoffrey P. Miller, Damages Versus
Specific Performance: Lessons from Commercial Contracts, 12 J. EMPIRICAL LEG. STUD. 29,
68 (2015) (“Our data provide modest endorsement of specific performance being subordinate
to the default damages rule because a majority of contracts accept the default rule . . .”); Jeffrey
L. Harrison, A Nihilistic View of the Efficient Breach, 2013 MICH. ST. L. REV. 167, 209 (2013)
(“Arguments that specific performance is more efficient apply a very myopic concept of
efficiency.”); Edward Yorio, In Defense of Money Damages for Breach of Contract, 82
COLUM. L. REV. 1365, 1424 (1982) (“[T]he case for expanding the availability of specific
performance is seriously flawed.”); Richard A. Posner, Let Us Never Blame A Contract
Breaker, 107 MICH. L. REV. 1349, 1361 (2009) (endorsing the traditional rule but recognizing
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Others, most recently including law and economic scholars, have argued
otherwise, viewing SP as the better or more efficient remedy.18
Alan Schwartz has argued that SP is more efficient than damages
because it achieves the goal of compensation better and reduces transaction
costs in the negotiation and performance of contracts.19 However, it seems
that Chinese jurisprudence is inconclusive as to whether there should be an
increased use of SP instead of deferring to a damage calculation.20 The
use of SP is clearly warranted in cases where damages are difficult to prove.21
An example is where the non-delivery of a component part results in lost
sales (breach of downstream contracts), which will cause negative
reputational effects into the future. If Party A elects to breach a contract to
deliver component parts to Party B in a just-in-time contract (where substitute
parts are not readily at hand), Party B will under-produce the amount of its
product needed to fulfill existing downstream contracts. Party B will be able
to collect lost profits for its failure to perform on existing contracts with its
customers. However, it is conceptually clear that a loss of future sales will
also be suffered by Party B. Some of Party B’s existing buyers will go
elsewhere to fill their needs and Party B may be branded as a non-reliable
supplier. However, these damages will not be collectable because they are
speculative in nature; there is no certain way to determine the actual damages.
Under the common law, SP would be denied because the goods were
relatively fungible in nature. A court may also argue that Party B should have
taken precautions to prevent a gap in production. Civil law is more likely to
see the uniqueness of component parts at the time of breach. A civilian court
may also recognize the under-compensatory nature of contract damages in
such a scenario and see that only SP has the ability to make Party B whole.
This is assuming that the order of SP is available prior to the production
stoppage. In sum, the argument for the expanded use of SP in the common
that the arguments for and against the rule are “not conclusive . . .”).
18 E.g., Alan Schwartz, The Case for Specific Performance, 89 YALE L. J. 271, 305 (1979)
(“Because specific performance is a superior method for achieving the compensation goal,
promisees should be able to obtain specific performance on request.”); Thomas S. Ulen, The
Efficiency of Specific Performance: Toward a Unified Theory of Contract Remedies, 83 MICH.
L. REV. 341, 343 (1984) (“[S]pecific performance is more likely than any form of money
damages to achieve efficiency in the exchange and breach of reciprocal promises”); see also
Shavell, supra note 12, at 875-76 (describing that some evidence exists that specific
performance is the preferred remedy). Cf. Timothy J. Muris, The Costs of Freely Granting
Specific Performance, 1982 DUKE L. J. 1053 (1982).
19 Schwartz, supra note 19, at 271 .
20 Lei Chen, Availability of Specific Remedies in Chinese Contract Law, in STUDIES
IN THE CONTRACT LAWS OF ASIA I: REMEDIES FOR BREACH IN OF CONTRACT 21 (Mindy
Chen-Wishart, Alexander Loke & Burton Ong eds., 2016) [hereinafter Availability of
Specific Remedies].
21 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 360(a) (1981) (A factor in determining
whether damages are inadequate, thereby justifying an order of SP, is “the difficulty of proving
damages with reasonable certainty . . .”).
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law has been rooted in the rationales of efficiency and morality.22
B. Civil Law’s Application of the Remedy of Specific Performance
Again, civil law recognizes SP as an ordinary remedy, meaning a nonbreaching party has the right to elect between pure damages or SP even in
cases of fungible goods.23 The purpose of this article is to determine whether
SP is more likely to be awarded under a civil law system than a common law
system by undertaking an analysis of the Chinese court system as a case
study. China is a civil law country, in which contract law views damages and
SP as primary and equal remedies.24
The empirical survey presented here, which includes the collection of
questionnaires from over three hundred Chinese judges, seeks to ascertain
whether or not and to what extent the above legal divergence is reflected in
actual judicial practice in the Chinese court system. Chinese law presents a
particularly important and understudied area for the study of the use of SP as
a remedy of first choice. This is due to the changing legal and economic
context in which contract law and the dynamics of business transactions have
undergone in the last few decades.25 As a result, a gap exists between contract
law’s underlying assumptions (law in books) and the modern reality of how
22

From a normative perspective, there are arguments for specific performance and
arguments for damages. Shiffrin, supra note 8 at 722; Kronman, supra note 18, at 351; Hayk
Kupelyants, Specific Performance in the Draft Common Frame of Reference, 1 U. COLL.
LOND. J. L. & JURIS. 15, 45 (2012). See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 359
(1981). Comment a states that: “There is, however, a [modern] tendency to liberalize the
granting of equitable relief [SP] by enlarging the classes of cases in which damages are not
regarded as an adequate remedy.” This statement recognizes that efficiency rationales must be
balanced against morality or justice rationales.
23 SOLÈNE ROWAN, REMEDIES FOR BREACH OF CONTRACT: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF
THE PROTECTION OF PERFORMANCE 19 (2012).
24 The Chinese civil law tradition finds its historical roots in the late Qing Dynasty (1902–
1911). Lei Chen, The Historical Development of the Civil Law Tradition in China: a Private
Law Perspective, 78 THE LEGAL HIST. REV. 159, 179 (2010) [hereinafter Historical
Development]; Lei Chen, Contextualizing Legal Transplant: China and Hong Kong, in
METHODS OF COMPARATIVE LAW 202-03 (P.G. Monateri ed., 2012). The influence of the
German Civil Code is also seen when the Qing Civil Code Draft followed the German
approach when it separated the civil code from a special commercial code. See DOUGLAS R.
REYNOLDS, CHINA, 1898–1912: THE XINZHENG REVOLUTION AND JAPAN 18-28 (1993). The
common law’s focus on individualism did not fit well with Chinese communitarianism; also,
the scattered nature of common law legal sources was consuming to Chinese scholars. See
Roscoe Pound, The Chinese Civil Code in Action, 29 TUL. L. REV. 277, 289 (1955).
25 Take third party rights for example. Initially when the Contract Law of 1999 was
enacted, the legislature affirmed the principle of contractual privity in the absence of explicit
recognition of third-party rights. However, given the social and economic condition changes,
the time is ripe to introduce a legislative reform granting a third party an independent right of
action. See Lei Chen, Relaxations of Contractual Privity and the Need for Third Party Rights
in Chinese Contract Law, in STUDIES IN THE CONTRACT LAWS OF ASIA II: FORMATION AND
THIRD PARTY BENEFICIARIES 62-63 (Mindy Chen-Wishart, Alexander Loke & Burton Ong
eds., 2018).
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contract law is applied (law in action).26 This study will show that the
generalization that Chinese courts treat SP as a routine remedy is not only
superficial, but belies actual practice.
The substantial body of literature justifying the use or nonuse of SP,
discussed above, lacks empirical verification.27 Despite the existence of a rich
and deep theoretical literature on the relative merits and moral justifications
of SP and damages as contract remedies,28 there is a surprising dearth of
empirical research. This presents an opportunity for scholars to explore and
further understand this academic debate in the context of empirical studies,
such as the current undertaking on the use of SP in the Chinese court
system.29 At the same time, empirical studies could help respond to the lack
of reliable and empirical knowledge about the application of law by the
Chinese court system. There is no comparable study on the use of contract
remedies in China. This article attempts to provide information on two core
issues: (1) how readily do Chinese courts award specific performance for
breach of contract; and (2) what are the core factors or rationales that
influence their choice of remedies? An ancillary question to be addressed is
longitudinal in nature: are changes implemented by the 1999 unification of
Chinese Contract Law and subsequent developments reflected in judicial
26

The “law in books” versus “law in action” distinction is longstanding. See Roscoe
Pound, Law in Books and Law in Action, 44 AM. L. REV. 12 (1910); see also Jean-Louis
Halpérin, Law in Books and Law in Action: The Problem of Legal Change, 64 ME. L. REV. 45
(2011) (analyzing the distinction as discussed by Roscoe Pound and the European legal
theories that are influenced by the ideas of Hans Kelsen, H.L.A. Hart, and Alf Ross about law
and facts).
27 Interestingly, in reformulating a moral argument challenging the instrumentalist view
of contract remedy in favor of expectation interest, Klass argues that the dual performance
hypothesis, i.e. to perform or pay damages may not be empirically sound. Gregory Klass, To
Perform or Pay Damages, 98 VA. L. REV. 143, 158 (2012).
28 Wang Li Ming & Xu Chuanxi, Fundamental Principles of China’s Contract Law, 13
COLUM. J. ASIAN L. 1, 15 (1999); HAN, supra note 4, at 536-37; Shiyuan Han, Culpa in
Contrahendo in Chinese Contract Law, 6 TSINGHUA CHINA L. REV. 157, 169 (2013); BING
LING, CONTRACT LAW IN CHINA 418-26 (2002).
29 To the best knowledge of this PI, there is only one empirical study dealing with Chinese
contract remedies up to now. See Lei Chen, Specific Performance as a Contractual Remedy
in Chinese Courts: An Empirical Study, 7 CHINESE J. COMP. L. 95 (2019). Another study,
strictly speaking, is not an empirical study on contract law, but rather on contract behavior.
See Yifan Hu & Larry D. Qiu, An Empirical Analysis of Contracting by Chinese Firms, 21
CHINA ECON. REV. 423, 426 (2010) (arguing that firms are more likely to use formal contracts
as opposed to relational ones if they are located in a city different from the firm’s main
business location). Different from contract law scholarship in China, there are quite a number
of empirical studies on contract law in the US. See, e.g., David Baumer & Patricia Marschall,
Willful Breach of Contract for the Sale of Goods: Can the Bane of Business be an Economic
Bonanza?, 65 TEMP. L. REV. 159 (1992); Russell Korobkin, The Status Quo Bias and Contract
Default Rules, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 608 (1998); Fred S. McChesney, Tortious Interference
with Contract Versus “Efficient” Breach: Theory and Empirical Evidence 28 J. LEGAL STUD.
131 (1999); Oren Bar-Gill & Lucian Arye Bebchuk, Consent and Exchange, 39 J. LEGAL
STUD. 375, 397 (2010).
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practice on remedies for breach of contract?
III. HISTORY OF CONTRACT LAW AND SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE
IN CHINA
This part will briefly analyze the modern history of contract law in
China. The first section moves from the planned economy during the first
part of the Communist Party rule to the initial entry of China into foreign
investment and international trade. Under the communist planned economy,
there was little use for monetary compensation in the private sphere since
private property rights were not recognized.30 Upon entering the global
economy and transitioning to a partial market economy, Western-style
contract laws were enacted, but in a fragmented way.31 The second section
reviews the unification of Chinese contract law with the enactment of the
Chinese Contract Law of 1999. The final section examines the role of SP in
modern Chinese contract law.
A. Planned Economy and the Economic Contract Law of 1981
Under the socialistic legal system, SP was viewed as a common remedy
and was often preferred over damages.32 In some areas, SP was considered
to be the ordinary remedy and the award of damages as the extraordinary
remedy.33 Part of the explanation for this reversed prioritization is due to the
difficulty of the non-breaching party (buyer) to obtain substituted goods in a
planned economy.34 In China’s planned economy, supply often did not meet
demand.35 There were no advanced secondary markets for goods and scarcity
of certain goods was not uncommon.36 An arrangement to purchase goods
from another supplier could prove difficult and time consuming. As a
consequence, the goals set by the central economic planners for an enterprise
could not be achieved because the enterprise received money instead of the
goods it needs for production.37 Therefore, monetary compensation was an
inadequate remedy as there were a limited number of suppliers in the market,
making SP arguably the more efficient remedy.
30 Wang Li Ming, Specific Performance in Chinese Contract Law: An East-West
Comparison, 1 ASIA PAC. L. REV. 18, 22 (1992); Chenggang Xu, The Fundamental Institutions
of China’s Reforms and Development, 49 J. ECON. LIT. 1076, 1077-81 (2011).
31 Li Ming, supra note 30, at 20.
32 Id.
33 Id. at 19.
34 Id. at 22.
35 Id.
36 Jacques deLisle, China’s Foreign Economic Contract Law and Technology Import
Regulations, 27 HARV. INT’L L. J. 275, 276 (1986).
37 Bernhard Grossfeld, Money Sanctions for Breach of Contract in a Communist
Economy, 72 YALE L. J. 1326, 1338 (1963) (“[T]he enterprise is liable for the acts of all its
members in the preparation, execution, and performance of contracts which result in a failure
to conclude the contract within the time prescribed by the plan . . .”).
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Against the background of a centralized planned economy, actual
performance was of paramount importance for every unit of the economy,
including the courts. Non-performance by one supplier or producer could
cause a waterfall effect in the supply chain, leading to numerous breaches of
contracts and missed quotas set by the central plan. The principle of SP was
accepted as the norm, as it was necessary in order to place the non-breaching
party in the position that it would have been had the contract been performed.
The granting of pure compensatory damages was not a proper fit in an
economy characterized by scarcity of supply, mandated quotas, and the
affixation of government penalties in cases of not meeting the pre-determined
quotas.38
Thus, even when contracting parties had expressly agreed that the SP
remedy would be waived in favour of monetary compensation, such a
contract term was often ignored as improperly restricting the Chinese courts’
remedial function.39 According to Article 35 of the Economic Contract Law
(“ECL”), the defaulting party still needed to continue the performance under
the contract even after damages have been paid, if so demanded by the nonbreaching party.40 This indicates that the payment of damages did not
necessarily mean that the non-breaching party had waived the remedy of
SP.41 Monetary compensation was categorically stated to be a remedy of last
resort in cases where SP is virtually impossible to render.42 Another feature
of SP in the planned economy era was that where SP was possible, neither
party may demand, offer, or accept termination instead.43 Further, SP was
38 The first Western-style or modern contract law detailed the role of the planned contract
system. Article 11 states:

For economic dealings involving products and items included in the state mandatory plan, the
economic contracts must be signed according to the quotas set by the State; if no agreement is
reached at the time of the signing, the matter shall be dealt with by the planning organ superior
to both parties. As for economic dealings involving products and items included in the state
guidance plan, the economic contracts shall be signed according to the actual conditions of the
units concerned in reference to the quotas set by the State.

The Economic Contract Law of the People’s Republic of China (adopted at the fourth session
of the fifth Nat’l People’s Cong., Dec. 13, 1981) [hereinafter China Economic Contract Law].
39 Seana Valentine Shiffrin, Remedial Clauses: The Overprivatization of Private Law, 67
HASTINGS L. J. 407, 407 (2016). Professor Shiffrin more broadly makes the case against such
contract terms: “I contend that the traditional presumption against such clauses enforces
important values central to the rule of law, including that private parties should not decide
their own cases and that the public has a special interest in deciding what remedies are
appropriate for breaches of legal duty.” Id. at 407.
40 Li Ming Wang, supra note 30, at 21. (Professor Li Ming Wang notes that the Chinese
courts at the time gave priority to the specific performance remedy.) China Economic Contract
Law, supra note 39, at Article 35 (“If the processing work does not [live] up to the required
quality and quantity stipulated in the contract, it should undertake repairs free of charge, make
up for the shortage in quantity or, ask for less remuneration depending on the circumstances.”).
41 Li Ming, supra note 30, at 21.
42 Id.
43 Treitel, supra note 7, at 155.
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available irrespective of the fault of the defaulting party.44
B. Chinese Contract Law of 1999
China’s attempt to transition to a partial market economy in the 1980s
led to the enactment of a series of fragmented contract laws including the
Economic Contract Law, Foreign Economic Contract Law, and the
Technology Contract Law.45 In 1988, China acceded to the United Nations
Convention on Contracts for the International Sales of Goods (“CISG”).46
The earlier contract laws were not conducive to uniformity of law and a free
market system. The adoption of the CISG was a move in the right direction
since it provided a Western-style model for a uniform sales law and would
become a source document for the implementation of a uniform Chinese
contract law.
When the Chinese Contract Law was drafted in the 1990s, economic
and social conditions had changed dramatically as China accelerated its
transformation from a planned economy into a partial-market economy. The
increased efficiency of the market economy and the privatization of property
rights allowed supply and demand for goods to be based on free market
dynamics instead of the inefficient government allocation system under a
command economy. The result was the growth of secondary markets based
upon real world supply and demand, which increased the availability of
purchasing substituted goods in cases of breach of contract. The Chinese
Contract Law of 1999 was drafted in the context of this transition and the
increase of market efficiency.
Thus, the traditional role of SP as a preferred contract remedy gave way
to SP being considered as one of the standard contractual remedies. In sum,
SP’s place in contract law’s remedial structure radically changed from the
default or preferred remedy to just another contractual remedy.47 The
question remained whether the growth of a market economy and the adoption
of a more modern contract law would lead to SP becoming a secondary
remedy to the awarding of contract damages.
C. Specific Performance Under Modern Chinese Contract Law
The primary legislative sources of Chinese contract law are the General
44

Weiguo Wang, On Specific Performance, 3 STUD. L. 17 (1984).
See China Economic Contract Law, supra note 39; Law of the People’s Republic of
China on Foreign-Related Economic Contracts (effective July 1, 1985) [hereinafter CFECL];
Law of the People’s Republic of China on Technology Contracts (effective Nov. 11, 1997)
[hereinafter CTCL].
46 CISG,
supra note 7. The full text of the CISG is available at
http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/ uncitral_texts/sale_goods/1980CISG.html. The CISG is
now the law of ninety-one countries. The status of signatories to the Convention is listed at
http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/uncitral_texts/sale_goods/1980CISG_status.html
(last
accessed July 16, 2019).
47 Availability of Specific Remedies, supra note 20, at 23-25.
45
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Principles of Civil Law of 1986 (GPCL) and the Chinese Contract Law
(CCL) of 1999.48 The GPCL, albeit vague, broadly covers property rights,
contractual obligations, intellectual property rights, marital rights, unjust
enrichment, tort liability, and legal remedies. The CCL is the most
comprehensive and specific statute on contracts in China. In practice, since
the statutes are abstract and incomplete, the GPCL and the CCL are
supplemented by governmental regulations and judicial interpretations of the
Supreme People’s Court (SPC). The courts, especially the SPC, play an
influential role in spelling out concrete rules concerning contractual disputes.
There are two judicial interpretations on contract law issued by the SPC,
namely, Interpretation Numbers I and II.49 Judicial interpretations serve as
the “most important and active interpretation authority in China . . .”50
Judicial interpretations issued by the SPC, although not directly binding on
the courts, are sometimes referred to as “quasi-legislation.”51
Under Chinese law, in cases of breach of contract or failure to cure
defective performance within the requisite period of time, the aggrieved party
is entitled to either: (1) a claim for specific performance, or (2) the
cancellation of the contract. In either case, the non-breaching party is also
entitled to make a claim for damages.52 Article 107 of the CCL states that
“[w]here a party fails to perform his contractual obligations or where his
performance of the contractual obligations is not in conformity with the
agreement, he shall bear liability for breach of contract by continuing his
performance, taking remedial measures, paying damages and so forth.” This
provision indicates that after a breach or failure to perform, the breaching
party still has the duty of “continuing his performance,” as well as paying
damages.53 Article 112 provides that where a party fails to perform its
obligations under the contract or its performance fails to conform to the
contract, and the other party suffers further damages after the performance of
48

General Principles of the Civil Law of the People’s Republic of China [Revised] (1986
General Provisions) (promulgated by the National People’s Congress Apr. 12, 1986, effective
Jan. 1, 1987, as amended by the Decision of the NPC Standing Committee on Amending
Some Laws (promulgated Aug. 27, 2009)) [hereinafter GPCL]; China Economic Contract
Law, supra note 41, at art. 58.
49 Interpretation of the Supreme People’s Court on Issues Concerning the Application of
the Contract Law of the People’s Republic of China (II) (promulgated by the Jud. Committee
of the Supreme People’s Ct., 9 Feb. 2009, effective May 13, 2009) (China),
http://www.cmac.org.cn/wp-content/uploads/2018/08/Interpretation-of-the-SupremePeoples-Court-on-Several-Issues-Concerning-Application-of-the-Contract-Law-of-thePeoples-Republic-of-China-2.pdf (China).
50 JIANFU CHEN, CHINESE LAW: TOWARDS AN UNDERSTANDING OF CHINESE LAW, ITS
NATURE AND DEVELOPMENT 108 (1999).
51 LING, supra note 28, at 32. These are general model decisions that attempt to clarify
the statutory law and are considered part and parcel of the legislation, much like the comments
found in the United States’ Uniform Commercial Code.
52 HAN, supra note 4, at 775.
53 CCL, supra note 4, at art. 107.
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the obligation or adoption of remedial measures, the breaching party shall
compensate the other party for such damages.54 It is notable that the key
consideration in determining whether damages and SP can be concurrently
awarded is whether SP would cause over-compensation to the non-breaching
party.55 Article 110 notes that the non-breaching party has the right to
demand performance, but qualifies it in cases where “the subject matter of
the obligation is unsuitable for enforced performance or the cost of
performance would be excessively high.”56
Some scholars argue that SP takes precedence in the hierarchy of
remedies since it is listed first in Article 107.57 Others maintain that there is
no hierarchical preference between damages and specific performance given
the fact that both appear in the same sentence.58 While SP is not expressly
stated to be a primary remedy in China, it is, as a matter of principle,
generally available as an option for aggrieved parties.59 Nonetheless, this
does not necessarily mean that Chinese courts readily issue judicial orders
for SP.60
On the surface, the complaining party has the right to choose the remedy
of SP over damages. However, courts retain a degree of discretion whether
to issue an order of SP. In Chinese law, there are generally recognized
limitations on the remedy of specific performance: excuse or exemption
(impossibility or force majeure), contracts for personal services, untimely
claim, and, most importantly, where the costs of performance outweigh the
benefits received by the promisee.61 The latter ground of discretion is known
as the disproportionality limitation and “is a manifestation of the principle of
good faith.”62 The disproportionality principle provides courts the discretion
to consider benefits and costs. Also, damages are awarded when SP is
impossible, impractical, or excessive, when the creditor does not request SP
within a reasonable period of time63 or contravenes the good faith principle
because of her failure to mitigate64, in cases of the debtor’s hardship arising
54

CCL, supra note 4, at art. 112.
HAN, supra note 4, at 774.
56 CCL, supra note 4, at. art. 110 (2).
57 WANG LI MING [王利明], HE TONG FA YAN JIU [STUDY ON CONTRACT LAW 合同法研究
] 557 (2011).
58 HAN, supra note 4, at 316.
59 This approach has been adopted even before the 1999 Contract Law. The GPCL and
the other two pieces of pre-1999 contract legislation had made such a choice. See GPCL, supra
note 49, at art. 111 (China); CFECL, supra note 46, at art.18; CTCL, supra note 46, at art.
17(1).
60 Availability of Specific Remedies, supra note 20, at 21.
61 CCL, supra note 4, at art. 110.
62 Availability of Specific Remedies, supra note 20, at 29.
63 CCL, supra note 4, at art. 110(2).
64 GPCL, supra note 49, at art. 114 and CCL, supra note 4, at art. 119 (1) enunciate the
rule of mitigation. This rule stipulates that the aggrieved party shall take prompt and
reasonable measures to prevent further losses. If the measures are not taken, the aggrieved
55
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from a change of circumstances65, or for administrative considerations. Thus,
the restrictions to the rule of general availability are as significant as the rule
itself.
In sum, Chinese formal law does provide a hierarchy between the
remedies of damages and specific performance. So, theoretically, the nonbreaching party has the option of seeking damages or SP, or both. However,
a petition for a SP order is not automatically approved since the courts still
retain discretion on whether to provide such a remedy. The question remains:
“[h]ow readily do Chinese courts award SP for breach and what factors
influence the choice of remedy in their awards?”66 There are two dimensions
to framing an answer to this question—the judicial perspective and the
plaintiff’s perspective. The courts may accept the law that the remedies of
damages and SP are on par, but this does not mean that the courts view SP as
a preferred remedy or as the default remedy. From the perspective of the
aggrieved party, damages have been the most common remedy sought due to
the additional costs associated with enforcing an order of SP.67
Another issue that plays a role in the use of SP is the Chinese law on the
enforceability of penalty clauses. Liquidated damages or penalty provisions
are ubiquitous in Chinese contract practice. The difference between Chinese
and American practices is that penalties are unenforceable under American
law,68 while they are enforceable under Chinese law.69 Since penalties are
enforceable in China, the non-breaching party may receive supraparty is not entitled to request compensation for any further loss.
65 See Gordon Y.M. Chan, The Doctrine of Change of Circumstances in Chinese Contract
Law 3 (Sep. 28, 2011), (unpublished paper, Faculty of Law, The Chinese University of Hong
Kong) (available at https://ssrn.com/abstract=1934085) (this interpretation formalized the
“change of circumstance” to exempt parties from continued performance of contract, a term
first mentioned in China in the case of Wuhan Gas Co. v. Chongqing Detection Instrument
Plant in 1992.).
66 Lei Chen, Damages and Specific Performance in Chinese Contract Law, in CHINESE
CONTRACT LAW: CIVIL AND COMMON LAW PERSPECTIVES 378 (Larry DiMatteo & Lei Chen
eds., 2018).
67 Id. at 379. (“The reality is that even though specific performance is generally available
(on a par with damages) to the claimants as a remedy, it is rarely sought due to practical
concerns.”).
68 Common law historian Theodore F.T. Plucknett traces the role of equity in the
formation of the penalty rule to a 1309 case in which the court reasoned that “this is not
properly a debt but a penalty; and with what equity can you demand this penalty?” THEODORE
F.T. PLUCKNETT, A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW 677 (5th ed. 1956). RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 356 (1981), Comment b states:
Damages for breach by either party may be liquidated in the agreement but only at
an amount that is reasonable in the light of the anticipated or actual loss caused by
the breach and the difficulties of proof of loss. A term fixing unreasonably large
liquidated damages is unenforceable on grounds of public policy as a penalty.
See, e.g., In re A.J. Lane & Co., Inc., 113 B.R. 821, 828 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1990) (A penalty
must be voided “even when the transaction is fully voluntary and the parties have equal
bargaining power.”).
69 Chen, supra note 67, at 394-96.
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compensatory damages70 that likely diminish the appeal of SP. An
explanation of the causal relationship between penalties, compensatory
damages, and SP is the nature of recoverable damages. If damages were truly
compensatory, then the non-breaching party should be indifferent to whether
it receives damages or SP. Given the other costs related to the enforcement
of SP, the preferred remedy from the plaintiff’s perspective should be
damages. However, if compensatory damages do not cover the actual harm,
which may include inconvenience, loss of productivity, non-recoverable
legal costs, and emotional stress, then SP should be the preferred remedy.71
Finally, if penalties allow for the collection of full compensatory damages
and possibly more, then the enforcement of the penalty clause would be
preferred over SP. In a sense, penalties act as a SP substitute.72 Unfortunately,
the empirical survey was unable to capture the nature of the interrelationships
between damages, penalties, and SP.
IV. EMPIRICAL SURVEY OF CHINESE JUDGES
Unlike previous works, which focused primarily on doctrinal analyses
of black letter law,73 this project undertakes an empirical examination of the
judicial practice of granting SP in China. It questions whether SP is a
common remedy granted in most types of cases. Alternatively, if in
practice SP is not given as an ordinary remedy, then in what types of cases
will the courts make an order of SP available? What factors or criteria do
the Chinese courts assess when deciding to grant SP?
This article tests the “convergence” theory74 through an empirical
survey administered to judges in China. To be specific, this project aims to
explore the following research questions:
(1) How often do Chinese courts use SP as a remedy for contract breaches?
70 Ibid. Contract law damages are based upon compensating the non-breaching party for
harm caused by the breach based on the expectancy interest (putting the party in the place in
the future that they would have been but for the breach). Therefore, damages that are supracompensatory would be punitive in nature, which is not allowed in the common law, but is
enforceable in the civil law and, therefore, under the Chinese civil law system.
71 Jeffrey Standen, The Fallacy of Full Compensation, 73 WASH. U.L.R. 145, 225 (1995)
(“The available remedial means of ensuring full compensation, such as injunctions, specific
performance and restitution, are issued at a price, not just to the defendant, but also to the
community . . .”).
72 See Larry A. DiMatteo, Penalties as Rational Response to Bargaining Irrationality,
2006 MICH. ST. L. REV. 883, 890 (2006).
73 LI MING, supra note 4; HAN, supra note 4.
74 Co-operative Insurance Society Ltd. v. Argyll Stores (Holdings) Ltd. [1998] AC 1 (HL)
11-12 (appeal taken from AC). Again, the convergence theory holds that the civil and common
law remedies have been converging overtime. The analysis presented here shows that Chinese
courts are not indifferent between the remedies of damages and to SP. In fact, they frugally
use the remedy of SP, more so than in the common law, but not as robustly is allowed in civil
law.
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It is predicted that the empirical survey will show that SP is granted far
less frequently than commonly assumed. In common law terminology,
the survey should show that SP is not an ordinary remedy as represented
in Chinese contract law, but in practice it is viewed and applied as an
extraordinary remedy.
(2) What are the factors that are most predictive of judges’ likelihood of
granting SP? Relatedly, do Chinese courts respect the parties’ ex ante
specification of their preferences for SP or damages?
(3) If the study finds that SP is awarded infrequently, what are the
underlying reasons or rationales given for its underutilization? Are there
organizational, professional, or individual reasons that restrict the use
of SP as an ordinary remedy?
(4) Further, are defendants more amenable to paying damages, sometimes
damages higher than normal or compensatory damages where it appears
the claimant has an objectively high probability of obtaining an order of
SP? Does the probability of obtaining SP anchor settlement
negotiations?
These questions seek to compare the ‘law in the books’ (SP as primary
remedy) to the ‘law in action.’75 The survey hopes to determine whether SP
is used more frugally despite the legal right of the buyer to choose the
remedy. The common law has had a modest degree of influence on Chinese
contract law. If frugality is found, does the use of SP in China signal a civil
law-common law hybrid or convergence of the views of civil and common
law thinking on SP?
A questionnaire was constructed in order to obtain a dataset of Chinese
judges’ perspectives concerning remedies for contract breaches.76 The
findings are critical to understanding the status of the SP remedy in contract
enforcement in Chinese courts, as they continue to transition from a
customary law system to the application of Western-style laws. The analysis
also offers an innovative perspective to observe contract remedies and to
understand the institutional dynamics and constraints in shaping the
performance interests of contracting parties.77
The sections below describe the research objectives of the empirical
study of judicial attitudes toward the granting of specific performance. It
provides a list of questions and assumptions that were brought to the survey
effort and explains the characteristics and size of the survey sample. Finally,
it discusses the scope and limitations of the research and reports on its
75 See Schwartz, supra note 19, at 272 (“Under current law, courts grant specific
performance when they perceive that damages will be inadequate compensation. Specific
performance is deemed an extraordinary remedy . . .”).
76 See infra Part III.C.
77 See infra notes 98-104 and accompanying text.
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findings.
A. Research Objectives
The function of contractual remedies is to place the non-breaching
promisee in as good a position as if the promisor performed,78 or to “make
the victim of a breach whole.”79 The “performance interest” forms the very
basis for a contract between parties and underpins the structure of contractual
remedies.80 There are two primary types of remedies available. The first
requires the defaulting party to pay monetary compensation, either to enable
the aggrieved party to purchase a substitute performance, or to compensate it
for lost profits and other incidental damages causally related to the breach.81
If the non-breaching party is fully compensated, then the party is theoretically
placed in the position that it would otherwise have been but for the breach.
The second major remedy requires the defaulting party to render the actual
performance as was promised. The former is known as legal damages while
the latter is referred to as SP. SP requires that when a party to a contract does
not perform an agreed obligation, by not delivering goods or delivering
defective goods, the other party can request the court to order the party in
breach to perform according to the terms of the contract.82 The party in breach
is required to undertake what it previously promised in the contract, albeit
often at a later point in time than originally agreed upon.
Doctrinally, while the common law world favors awarding damages
over ordering SP, civil law systems still endorse SP as a primary remedy.83
This has been challenged by some empirical studies, which maintain that
78

Schwartz, supra note 19, at 271.
Shavell, supra note 12, at 831.
80 See Daniel Friedmann, Performance Interest in Contract Damages, 111 L. QUARTERLY
REV. 628 (1995).
81 There are three generic limitations to damage recovery: (1) the damages must have been
foreseeable at the time of contracting; (2) the breaching party is not liable for damages that
would have been avoided through a reasonable mitigation; and (3) the injured party must prove
its damages with certainty. See FARNSWORTH, supra note 15, at 873-74.
82 Being aware of the difficulty in having a consensual definition among different legal
systems, this author attempts to provide this Chinese version, which hopefully is as
understandable as possible for foreign scholars.
83 In the common law of remedies, damages were obtained in the royal or government
courts, while non-damage remedies or equitable remedies, such as specific performance and
injunction, were within the jurisdiction of the ecclesiastical or equity courts. When the court
systems merged the common law marinated the distinction between legal remedy and
equitable remedy. The legal remedy (damages) was considered the ordinary remedy, while
equitable remedies were considered extraordinary, to be used when damages were deemed to
be inadequate. Damages are considered to be inadequate when the subject matter of a contract
is deemed to be unique, such as in the sale of real property. Kronman, supra note 17, at 351;
Dawson, supra note 7, at 495; PRINCIPLES, DEFINITIONS AND MODEL RULES OF EUROPEAN
PRIVATE LAW: DRAFT COMMON FRAME OF REFERENCE (DCFR) FULL EDITION, supra note 3, at
825; PRINCIPLES OF EUROPEAN CONTRACT LAW: PARTS I AND II, supra note 3, at 397-98;
Miller, supra note 3, at 288-89; Herman, supra note 7, at 6-7.
79
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different legal systems have reached similar results in practice.84 This
argument of the convergence of legal traditions asserts that in practice, there
is less difference between the common law and civilian systems than these
general doctrinal statements might suggest.85 Nonetheless, Douglas Laycock
concludes that when a court denies equitable relief such as SP, its real reasons
are derived from the interests of parties or the legal system, not from the
adequacy of the plaintiff’s legal remedy.86 This assertion implies that the
rates at which SP is awarded are not as low as common law doctrine would
suggest. Steven Shavell argues that parties would tend to prefer the remedy
of damages for breach of contracts to produce things due to high transaction
costs, whereas they would often favor the remedy of SP for breach of
contracts to convey property.87 The supervision costs of SP for the transfer
of existing property is minimal. In contrast, the supervision costs would be
high if SP is for the production of custom goods.88 Shavell submits that SP
in the latter case would, in many cases, result in a joint loss for the contracting
parties.89
Under Shavell’s analysis, if goods already exist then SP makes
economic sense, but when goods are yet to be produced (especially in highcost production) SP would be an inefficient remedy. However, if there were
no readily available substitute goods, then SP for the production of goods
may be preferred. In other words, parties dealing with different categories of
contracts prefer different remedies, which makes commercial sense. Shavell
correctly observes that the main purpose of SP, at least in the common law,
is in cases where the remedy of damages proves to be inadequate.90 This
would be in cases where compensatory damages are difficult to calculate or
the performance is difficult to value, cases where obtaining substitute goods
84
85

Lando & Rose, supra note 3.
Co-operative Insurance Society Ltd v Argyll Stores (Holdings) Ltd [1998] AC 1 (HL)

11-12.
86 Douglas Laycock, The Death of the Irreparable Injury Rule, 103 HARV. L. REV. 687,
771 (1990).
87 Shavell, supra note 12, at 859 (“[L]egal outcomes seem broadly consistent with the
economic theory in the important sense that specific performance appears to be employed as
a remedy primarily for breach of contracts to convey property rather than of contracts to
produce things or to provide services.”).
88 Id. at 846 (“[R]easons suggesting that parties to a contract to produce something would
prefer expectation damages to specific performance as the remedy for breach, since use of
specific performance would tend to lower joint value and impose risk on the seller relative to
use of the expectation measure.”).
89 Shavell, supra note 12, at 860. Shavell states that “problems in supervision would be
associated with a loss in joint value for the parties (because they would bear some of the costs
of supervision and because the performance itself might be poor).”
90 Id at 854 n.62 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 350 cmt. c, 360 cmt.
c (1981)) (“[I]t is often possible for the injured party to secure goods or services similar to
those in the contract by looking elsewhere in the market and that if these are available, the
damage remedy is usually adequate; however, if the goods or services are unique, the injured
party is more likely to be granted specific performance.”).
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proves to be difficult, and cases where the breaching party is unable to pay
compensatory damages (and the goods are attachable).91 This schematic of
the efficient application of SP will later be applied to the findings of the
empirical survey.92
B. Questions and Assumptions
Previous scholarship on SP has provided a certain degree of coherence
to the availability of SP under Chinese law.93 The goal of the current
undertaking is to empirically determine the use and availability of SP in
judicial practice. The goal of the study is to analyze the legal or judicial
prevalence and attitude towards SP. The empirical survey of judicial attitudes
towards SP will show how the taxonomy of the underlying contract dispute
influences the courts’ remedial choices.94 A taxonomy of contracts involves
the categorization or grouping of contracts based on transaction types, such
as sales of goods, sales of real property, licensing, leasing, construction, and
so forth. The survey also hopes to uncover whether there is a pattern where
judges actively attempt to persuade a claimant to change a claim for SP to a
claim for damages. To this end, the following set of assumptions and
corresponding research questions will be tested and explored.
1. How often do Chinese courts award SP in cases of contract breach?
The comparative contract law theory holds that civil law systems favor
or are more likely to order SP (than the common law, which gives damage
awards priority), but is this true for China?95 Will the evidence show that civil
law’s non-hierarchical view of damages and SP (equally available to
plaintiffs) is replicated in judicial practice? Or will the evidence show that
SP is seldom awarded, thereby supporting the view that Chinese contract
remedies are a hybrid system somewhere between the civil and common laws
as represented by convergence theory? It is expected that the data sample will
empirically show how frequently Chinese judges award SP in commercial
and civil disputes. To measure the robustness of SP as a remedy, a series of
questions asked Chinese quota judges96 to list the percentage of claims for
91

Id. at 859.
See infra Part IV.F.
93 Availability of Specific Remedies, supra note 20.
94 Lei Chen, Specific Performance as a Contractual Remedy in Chinese Courts: An
Empirical Study, 7 CHINESE J. COMP. L. 95, 112 (2019).
95 Herman, supra note 7, at 6-7.
96 In November 2017, Justice Zhou Qiang (周强), President of the SPC, announced the
third-round judicial reform (“this reform”) in the “Report of the SPC on the Comprehensive
Deepening of Judicial Reform by the People’s Court” (最高人民法院关于人民法院全面深
化司法改革情况的报告) available at http://www.court.gov.cn/zixun-xiang qing-66802.html.
As a concrete initiative on the professionalization of Chinese judges in this judicial reform,
the SPC established the Quota Judge System. The Quota Judge System aims to divide court
personnel into three categories: judges, trial assistants and judicial administrative personnel,
92
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which SP was granted. Other questions in the questionnaire, listed below,
were aimed at gaining a deeper understanding of the factors used by courts
in deciding whether to grant SP, as well as factors that are predictive of a
court not granting SP.
2. What are the controlling or predictive factors that influence judges’
decision to award SP? Do courts respect the parties’ ex ante
specification in their contract as to preferred remedy?
Under Chinese law, as a general rule, a party may have a choice in
requesting what it deems as an appropriate remedy, but this choice is subject
to the court’s discretion, taking into account the circumstances of each
individual case.97 Nonetheless, Chinese judicial practice encourage judges to
adopt an activist stance in persuading claimants to change the choice of
remedy before the court hearing if they find no compelling reason to award
SP. 98 Thus, the evidence should indicate that Chinese judges take a far more
proactive posture in the preliminary stages of a case than what is commonly
believed.
To examine these questions, we shall inquire as to whether judges
actively arrange and recognize taxonomy of contract types when considering
an award of SP. We suspect that where a judge actively considers taxonomy
of contracts, she is more likely to take a proactive stance in considering the
various remedies available to the claimant at the preliminary stages of a
claim. For example, where the commonly regarded taxonomy of contracts
indicates a claimant is in a dispute involving a category of contract where SP
is commonly awarded, such as in real estate sale contracts, then a judge will
defer to the claimant in its choice of the remedy of SP.
In some circumstances—such as instances where the underlying dispute
falls into certain categories of contracts that are seldom awarded SP, for
example a partnership agreement—consulting taxonomy of contracts might
convince a judge to deny the use of SP. The survey asks judges about such
circumstances and whether they ever consider actively persuading a claimant
to claim damages even though SP was requested in the preliminary summons
(complaint). The interplay between the act of consulting taxonomy of
contracts and deciding to persuade claimants to change their claim for SP to
a claim of damages will be explored with particular interest.
3. If SP is seldom awarded, what are the underlying reasons or rationales
for its frugal use? Under what circumstances is the remedy of SP likely
and to ascertain the number of judges. Consequently, only the judges in the assigned quota in
each court are allowed to hear the case and they are called quota judges.
97 CCL, supra note 4, at art. 107.
98 The system of judicial engagement of the parties pre-hearing to settle on the appropriate
remedy originated from the German civil procedure system of Aufklärung. See Some
Measures Concerning Civil Proofs (promulgated by the Supreme People’s Court, effective
April 1, 2002), at art. 35.
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to be granted and under what circumstances will its use be restricted?
Again, the starting point of Chinese Contract Law distinguishes
between monetary obligations (paying a sum of money)99 and non-monetary
obligations.100 With regard to monetary obligations, Article 109 stipulates
that: “where a party fails to pay the price or remuneration, the other party
may demand him to pay the price or remuneration.”101 For non-monetary
obligations, a party is entitled to enforce specific performance of a nonmonetary obligation if requested in a timely manner.102 The statutory
limitations, as noted earlier,103 on the availability of SP include impossibility,
disproportionality, good faith, and untimely claims are described in detail in
Article 110 of the CCL.104
In addressing this research question, the survey aims to look beyond the
statutory limitations above and taxonomy of contracts to investigate other
factors that might influence a judge to opt against awarding SP. Our objective
here is to query judges on their opinion regarding the supervision costs of
enforcement and whether it features prominently in a judge’s ultimate
decision to award SP. This line of inquiry seeks to test Shavell’s hypothesis
that transaction costs play a pivotal role in determining the request and
granting of SP.105 We hypothesize that transaction costs are an important but
not pivotal factor in the courts determination to preclude awarding SP.
Nonetheless, supervision costs are expected to be a factor among nontransactional cost factors and is an appropriate consideration to determine the
degree of its influence.
4. Will defendants be more amenable to settling for damages where it
appears that the claimant has a plausible likelihood of obtaining SP?
Court-annexed mediation is a popular practice in Chinese courts, since
it is used as a key performance indicator of the effectiveness of judges.106
Since judges encourage parties to settle their disputes, it would be interesting
to examine how the active settlement system affects the award of SP in
China. The objective here is to enquire as to the frequency in which
99

CCL, supra note 4, at art. 109.
Id. art. 110:
(1) Performance would be legally or objectively impossible; (2) the subject matter of the
obligation is unsuitable for enforced performance or performance would be unreasonably
expensive; or (3) the aggrieved party fails to enforce specific performance within a reasonable
time after the creditor has become, or could reasonably be expected to have become, aware of
the non-performance.
101 CCL, supra note 4, at art. 109.
102 Id.
103 Id. art. 53-56 and accompanying text.
104 Availability of Specific Remedies, supra note 20.
105 See supra notes 88 & 90 and accompanying text.
106 Cai Yanmin, Case Management in China’s Civil Justice System, in 39 CIVIL
LITIGATION IN CHINA AND EUROPE (van Rhee & Yulin eds., 2014).
100
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defendants across every level of the Chinese court system (Trial,
Intermediate, and the High Court) elect to settle for damages where it appears
that the claimant has an objectively real chance of being awarded SP. The
survey also seeks to examine trends in individual courts.
Vigorously exploring each of these questions is critical to understanding
the relative status of SP and damages as remedies for breach of contract. The
findings will be important to litigants, lawyers, and judges. And since
remedies support the contractual obligation itself, understanding remedies is
important for commerce more generally. From a normative perspective, the
research findings will shed light on the debate over whether one remedy is
superior to the other (allowing for the possibility that one remedy is better in
certain cases, while the other is better in other cases). Finally, it is especially
important to study these questions in contemporary China as the research
findings can be used to construct recommendations for statutory reform.
C. Survey Sample
A questionnaire pertaining to SP containing 13 questions was
administered to 400 quota judges within the Mainland Chinese court
system.107 The questionnaires included 12 multiple-choice questions and one
question asking the judges to estimate the percentage of cases where a
defendant elected to settle their case when an order of SP was likely. Overall,
the questionnaires were drafted to ascertain a range of data regarding judges’
general attitudes toward SP and to indicate whether judges preferred
damages, as opposed to SP, when a claim could ostensibly merit either.
To ensure that the sample was representative of the judicial population,
the questionnaires were randomly sent to judges across a variety and levels
of courts in distinct geographical and cultural provinces of Mainland China.
The questionnaires were sent to randomly selected High Court judges at the
Provincial level with jurisdiction to hear civil and commercial disputes. The
sample included courts in economically developed areas such as Guangdong,
Shandong, and Beijing to the less economically developed areas such as
Inner Mongolia, Huanan, and Guangxi.108 Additionally, every attempt was
made to obtain data from each level of the court system in these disparate
regions. The methodology necessitated that the survey include only quota
judges. The assumption was that the new quota judges possessed greater
expertise and legal knowledge than judges appointed prior to reforms of the
107

The Supreme People’s Court, pursuant to their stated aims of improving the
professionalism of court personnel, instituted reforms regarding the selection and appointment
system of judges. There “are nine selection and appointment steps”, the completion of which
will see judges selected to become quota judges based on merits. Judicial Reform of Chinese
Courts, The Supreme People’s Court of the People’s Republic of China, Mar. 3, 2016,
www.english.court.gov.cn.
108 The ten provinces/autonomous regions are Guangdong, Guangxi, Shandong, Beijing,
Hunan, Inner Mongolia, Hainan, Shanxi, Anhui, and Guizhou.
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judiciary.109 The use of quota judges also ensured a more robust comparison
across different geographical locations given the distinct population of
judges sampled. The power of the statistical analysis was ensured with an
ultimate data set of almost 400 returned questionnaires.
The high response rate was likely due to the simplicity of the
questionnaire. The questionnaire was intentionally drafted to be brief while
also being legally compelling. Thus, the final questionnaire could be
completed quickly but also offered the judges an opportunity to engage
intellectually in order to encourage a serious level of thought.
The questionnaire was drafted in Chinese and subsequently translated
into English. The questions translated into English are as follows:
(1) What is the length of your tenure as a judge?
(2) In what level of court do you currently preside?
(3) How many cases of contractual breach have you handled within your
capacity as a judge (presiding judge or member of a judicial panel)?
(4) Would you ever consider awarding SP where the claimant did not
request a SP order in its complaint?
(5) Do you know of any instances where a SP order was made by one of
your colleagues without a clear SP request by the claimant in its
pleadings?
(6) Taking into account all of the contractual breach cases you have
presided over, in what percentage would you say SP was awarded?
(7) Have you ever considered attempting to persuade the claiming party
to change a claim for SP to a claim for damages?
(8) In your experience, do you find a need to address the type of contract
and its subject matter when deciding whether or not to grant a SP
order?
(9) Do the supervision costs of enforcement factor related to SP weigh
heavily in making your decisions on the appropriate remedy?
(10) If you were the judge presiding over the scenarios below, how likely
would you be to award SP? Please indicate your reasoning:
a.

D agreed to pay P to advertise his business on rubbish bins; P
has a contract to supply the bins to the local government for the
period of three years. Before the advertisement was applied to
the bins, D tried to cancel the contract, but P refused and
continued with the advertisement campaign in order to demand

109 The quota system came into existence in 2016, which raised the qualifications needed
to become a judge.
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payment on the contract.
b.

D agreed to sell his apartment to P. After concluding the
property sale contract, D refused to complete the performance
because D found another buyer who was willing to pay a higher
price. P sued D for SP.

(11) In your experience, when the claimant requests a SP order, how often
do you find that the defendant works to settle the case before the
possible issuance of a decree of SP? Please indicate a percentage (0100%).
(12) If the parties included a liquidated damages provision in their
contract, would this affect your decision to award SP? Please explain
your reasoning.
Questionnaires that were largely incomplete or illegible were discarded
in order or to properly utilize a regression analysis. Due to the large amount
of incomplete questionnaires, no attempt was made to compute a propensity
score or perform a multiple imputation analysis. Nonetheless, the completed
questionnaires provided a robust sample size of 373 data inputs. Also, the
sample size for each of the three levels of the court system was significant.
Figure 1 below provides the numerical breadth of the Survey Sample.
Figure 1
Survey Sample
Judges
Surveyed

Excluded
Questionnaires

Semi-Complete
Questionnaires

Complete
Questionnaires

244

6

n121

n117

Intermediate

62

10

n4

n48

High Court

94

9

n39

n46

400

25

n164

n211

Court
Trial

Total

In sum, the survey sample provides a critical mass of data to ensure
statistical power. The sample size using semi-completed questionnaires not
excluded for being mostly incomplete or illegible totaled 373 spread across
three levels of the court system as follows: 236 from Trial Courts, 52 from
Intermediate Appeals Courts, and 85 from High Courts. The appellate cases
combined (Intermediate and High Courts) totaled 137. This included inperson interviews of judges by the investigator, which are discussed below.
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D. Methodology
This statistical data analysis and contextual examination sought to
investigate the prevalence of SP (in lieu of damages) as a contractual remedy
in civil and commercial disputes among the three levels of the Mainland
Chinese court system. This section provides a concise explanation of the
basic statistical methodology (quantitative analysis) and the context of
interviews conducted as part of the research (qualitative analysis).
As for the contextual examination, Mainland Chinese judges were
interviewed over the course of the years 2014-2017 at an annual training
program offered at the City University of Hong Kong. The interviewees were
judges who specifically deal with civil and commercial disputes. The judges
came from all three levels of court, and were from ten geographically diverse
provinces. Information obtained directly from judges provides important
insights into the perceptions, experiences, and approaches of judges to the
remedy of SP in any given case. In addition, the face-to-face interviews
allowed the researchers to identify a variety of factors—organizational,
professional, legal and personal, which affect judicial decision-making in this
area. The interviewer, Lei Chen, previously participated in two Supreme
People’s Court sponsored examination panels on the availability of SP in
Beijing Mentougou Trial Court and the Civil Tribunal No 1 of the SPC. Thus,
he posed an in-depth understanding of how Chinese courts view the
availability of SP across different categories of commercial disputes.
Excerpts from some of the interviews will be used to highlight certain
findings since the non-verbal responses of the interviewees cannot captured
by the regression analysis.
Many of the objectives of the research were addressed with hypothesis
testing and parameter estimation; the parameter of interest is the Odds Ratio
(“OR”).110 The hypothesis testing determined whether sufficient evidence
existed to suggest a rejection of the null hypothesis of no association.111 With
regard to addressing the association between the response Q7 and the
response to another question, say QX, the null hypothesis states that the
likelihood of a ‘Yes’ response to Q7 does not vary with the response to QX
or that the response to QX does not vary with the response to Q7.
110

The Odds Ratio (“OR”) is defined as “a measure of association between an exposure
and an outcome. The OR represents the odds that an outcome will occur given a particular
exposure, compared to the odds of that outcome occurring in the absence of that exposure.”
Magdalena Szumilas, Explaining Odds Ratios, J. CAN. ACAD. CHILD ADOLESC. PSYCHIATRY
227-29 (2010).
111 In general, the magnitude of association between two events E and E is measured
A
B
with the OR defined as a ratio of odds of event EA to the odds of EB, where the odds of EA, for
example, is the ratio of the probability PA that EA will occur divided by the probability 1-PA
that EA will not occur, PA/(1-PA), and the OR is PA/(1-PA) divided by PB/(1-PB) and OR=1 if
and only if PA=PB. The 95% confidence interval (CI) for the OR is an interval that contains
the true OR with 95% probability. We show both the OR and its 95% CI. In theory the CI will
contain 1 if and only if the p-value of the test statistic is > 0.05.
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Much of our statistical testing was carried out using the Fisher’s Exact
Test112, logistic regression and analysis of variance, as appropriate, with pvalues and supporting statistics for each method. The p-value is the
likelihood of observing data inconsistent with the null hypothesis; a smaller
p-value indicates increased evidence that the null is not true. A p-value less
than 0.05 is considered ‘statistically significant,’ suggesting that the data was
unlikely (with probability <0.05) to have occurred purely by chance if the
null is in fact true. Therefore, the discussion will revolve largely around those
responses that are statistically significant (with probability <0.05). However,
other data that is notable will also be discussed regardless of its statistical
significance.
It should be noted that the statistical significance of variation in the
mean value of Q11 (“In your experience, when the claimant requests a SP
order, how often do you find that the defendant works to settle the case before
the possible issuance of a decree of SP?”) was assessed with analysis of
variance and a Tuckey correction for pairwise court contrasts. Data is
summarized with the mean, standard deviation, median, minimum and
maximum by court and pairwise contrasts are summarized with the mean
difference, its standard error and a 95% confidence interval for the mean
difference.113 All statistical testing was two-sided with a nominal or
experiment wide significance level of 5%.114
E. Scope and Limitations of Research
It is important to underscore the fact that a judicial survey of the Chinese
courts has rarely been attempted. Not surprisingly, the research project faced
some considerable limitations. At the outset, all the information had to be
gathered to create an entirely new dataset without access to any existing
databases. Perhaps more importantly, given that the emphasis was on
contractual remedies, the surveys were only sent to judges dealing with civil
and commercial legal matters. As a result, the pool of judges that satisfied
the survey requirements was noticeably constrained. In an effort to ensure an
adequate sample size, we elected to survey all three levels of the Chinese
court system. However, even this proved to be a challenge. In the vast
province of Guangdong, for example, the Guangdong High Court has about
one hundred judges presiding over the entire region and only forty-seven of
those judges preside over civil and commercial disputes. 115 Fortunately, the
survey response rate was a robust 47 % (22 of 47).116
112 JOHN H. MCDONALD, Fisher’s Exact Test of Independence, in HANDBOOK OF
BIOLOGICAL STATISTICS 78-80 (3d ed. 2014).
113 RAMON C. LITTELL, GEORGE A. MILLIKEN, WALTER W. STROUP, RUSSELL D.
WOLFINGER & OLIVER SCHABENBERGER, SAS FOR MIXED MODELS 22-25 (2d ed. 2006).
114 SAS Version 9.4 for Windows was used throughout.
115 See details at the official website of Guangdong High People’s Court at
http://www.gdcourts.gov.cn/ index.php?v=listing&cid=70 (last visited Jan. 31, 2020).
116 Id.
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F. Statistical Findings
The following section details the statistical findings and provides a
concise interpretation presented in the corresponding tables. As with the
preceding section, these explanations will provide an encompassing
commentary that carefully explains the data for the reader.
1. How Often do Chinese Courts Award SP for Contract Breaches?
To evaluate this question, we analyzed Question 6 (Q6) (“Taking into
account all of the contractual breach cases you have presided over, in what
percentage would you say SP was awarded?”) with the responses divided into
‘0 - 10%’ and ‘> 10%’, then viewed the data with respect to Question 2 (Q2)
(“In what level of court do you currently preside?”). The responses to Q6
indicate the general frequency with which SP is awarded while concurrently
illustrating any trends within the different levels of the court system. The
findings are shown below in Figure 2.
Figure 2
Dichotomized Q6 Frequencies by Court Where Q6 is Not Missing
(N=339)
Court
Dichotomized
Trial
Q6
[0, 10]
136 (59.4)
[10, 100]
93 (40.6)
Total
229

Intermediate

High

Total

30 (39.4)
47 (61)
77

17 (35.4)
31 (64.6)
48

183
171
354

Overall, a little over 52% (183 out of 354) of all judges surveyed
awarded SP in less than 10% of claims. In examining Table 1, it becomes
clear that Trial Court judges rarely award SP when presiding over a claim of
contractual breach. At the Trial Court level, 59.4% of judges awarded SP in
less than 10% of their decisions. In the Intermediate and High Courts, the
number of judges who awarded SP in less than 10% of claims or less was
39.04% and 35.4%, respectively. After adjustment for Q1 (“What is the
length of your tenure as a judge?”) in a logistic regression of Q6, the
proportion of judges awarding SP in less than 10% of cases decreased in
Intermediate and High Courts relative to Trial Courts [Intermediate vs. Trial
OR=0.374 95% CI (0.1919, 0.7084) p=-0.0042. High vs Trial OR=0.431
95% CI (0.251, 0.7383) p=0.0021]. More telling is that overall across every
level of the court system nearly 59% of judges had never awarded SP. We
adjusted for Q1 to address the possibility of a skewered finding based upon
the length of service (amount of judicial experience).
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The data clearly indicates that the percentage of cases awarding SP
varies with the level of the court. In Trial Courts, SP is frugally awarded,
while there is a slight increase in SP awards at both the Intermediate and High
Court levels.117 One possible explanation could be that the Trial Courts are
under greater time pressure than the Intermediate and High Courts and,
therefore, incentivized to expeditiously conclude civil suits, which is best
achieved by awarding damages or other forms of monetary compensation
instead of SP. SP will inevitably involve the greater use of the court’s time
in supervising the enforcement of the performance.
There is also pressure on the Intermediate and High Courts under the
ordinary procedure, which requires judges to complete cases within six
months from the time the cases are filed. However, the amounts in dispute
for contract breach are much higher at the Intermediate and High Court
levels.118 In other words, the stakes on average (harm alleged per case) are
smaller at the lower Trial Court level.119 If the judges are under time pressure
to deal with a larger number of small cases, more likely than not they will try
to quickly settle the disputes either through monetary awards or courtannexed mediation. On the other hand, the appellate courts hear fewer cases
involving large amounts of money and are more likely to take the time to
consider SP as an alternative remedy.
Another explanation for the higher rate of issuance of SP in the appellate
courts is the greater level of expertise associated with judges on the higher
courts. It may be that the higher quality of appellate judges allows them to
partake in a deeper analysis that leads to decisions in favor of SP in cases
where the giving of damages is determined to be inadequate. The deeper
analysis likely uncovers findings that the harm caused is greater than the
damages that can be awarded. This would be an unlikely outcome under a
more superficial analysis. With these findings, we move to our Taxonomy
Persuasion Hypothesis120 to investigate whether Chinese judges’ preference
for damages affects the preliminary stages of a claim and their predisposition
117 This pressure is partially due to the prevalence of summary proceedings. According to
a national survey conducted by the Supreme People’s Court, 80% of civil litigation before the
Trial Courts apply the summary procedure, which means cases must be closed within 3 months
from the date they were officially filed. See more details at the Several Opinions of the
Supreme People’s Court on Further Promoting the Simplification of Cases, Streamlining and
Optimizing the Distribution of Judicial Resources issued by SPC in 2016《最高人民法院关
于进一步推进案件繁简分流优化司法资源配置的若干意见》, available at the official
website of the Supreme People’s Court: http://www.court.gov.cn/zixun-xiangqing26061.html.
118 Notice of the Supreme People’s Court on Adjusting the Standards for Jurisdiction of
Civil and Commercial Cases of the First Instance by the High and Intermediate People’s Court,
Fa Fa No. 7 (2015), available at the official website of the Supreme People’s Court:
http://www.court.gov.cn/shenpan-xiangqing-14366.html.
119 Id.
120 This hypothesis relates to contract types; simply put, breaches of certain types or
categories of contracts are more or less likely to be the beneficiary of SP orders.
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against granting SP. In sum, what factors or rationales explain the low rate
of the issuance of orders of SP?
2. Predictive Factors and Party Preference
What are the controlling or predictive factors that influence judges’
decisions to award SP? Do courts respect the parties’ ex ante specification in
their contract as to preferred remedy (such as a specific performance clause)?
These questions are tested based upon responses to Q8 and Q7. First, does
the type of contract involved in the dispute predict the likelihood of the
issuance of an order of SP? Second, is there a substantial amount of cases
where judges attempt to dissuade a claimant against a request for SP in favor
of a damages award? If so, what variables predict the disposition of the court
in favor of an award of damages? In analyzing these questions, the first
objective was to examine Q8 (“In your experience, do you find a need to
address a taxonomy of contracts when you decide whether to consider a SP
order?”). Are courts more willing to give SP for certain types of contracts
across each level of the court system? The more difficult question to verify
is whether judges take an active role in steering claimants to a preferred
remedy? The view of judges as passive or proactive players in determining
the claimant’s choice of remedy is posed by (Q7) (“Have you ever considered
persuading a party to change a claim for SP to a claim for damages?”). The
analysis attempts to find variables (addressed in other questions) that predict
a judge’s active intervention in the choice of remedy, such as years of
practice, the number of cases the judge presided over relating to breach of
contract, independent consideration of SP, the opinion of colleagues, the
percentage of contractual breach cases in which SP was awarded, the
taxonomy of contracts, the costs of supervision, and so forth. Regarding the
influence of contract type on SP, an unpublished report released by the
Beijing Mentougou trial court delineated the number of SP orders based on
contract categories (see Figure 3).121

121 ‘Report of Issues Concerning Continued Performance of Contracts’ is an unpublished
report under the auspice of Supreme People’s Court Research Project in 2013.
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Figure 3
Distribution of Cases Where There Was an Award of SP

Ratio of Distribution of Categories of Cases
Partnership agreement dispute合伙协议纠纷

0.95%

Cooperative real estate development disputes…

1.07%

Right to use of construction land disputes 建设…

1.18%

Contract agreement disputes 承揽合同纠纷

1.18%

Contract agreement disputes 承包合同纠纷

1.30%

Equity transfer contract disputes 股权转让合同…

1.30%

Sale of commercial houses contract disputes 商…

1.30%

Private lending disputes 民间借贷纠纷

1.54%

Commercial housing sales contract disputes 商…

2.13%

Construction project contract disputes 建设工…

2.37%

Service contract disputes 服务合同纠纷
Contractual disputes 合同纠纷
Real estate lease contract disputes 房屋租赁合…

2.37%
3.43%
3.91%

Lease contract disputes 租赁合同纠纷

7.10%

Advance sales of commercial housing disputes…

7.33%

Compensation for housing demolition and…

8.52%

Sales contract disputes 买卖合同纠纷

10.18%

Real estate sales contracts disputes 房屋买卖合…
0.00%

24.02%
5.00%

10.00% 15.00% 20.00% 25.00% 30.00%

Series1

The above figure shows that certain categories of contract disputes are
far more likely to obtain an order of SP. The findings are interesting in a
number of ways. First, the overall percentage of cases across categories of
contracts that granted SP was much lower than expected in a legal system
that does not prioritize remedies of SP and damages. It is no surprise that the
category of contracts most likely to result in a SP order relates to the sale of

305

Northwestern Journal of
International Law & Business

40:275 (2020)

real estate. This would also be the case under common law where real estate
is considered a unique subject matter that warrants the remedy of SP. The
importance of compelling performance in cases involving real estate is
amplified given that the great majority of contract categories relate to real
property (construction, housing, leasing, lending). Nonetheless, the
percentage of SP awards is very low.
Another surprising finding is that the second highest percentage of SP
orders relate to the sale of goods (10.18%). This certainly would not be the
case under the common law, where damages are the most commonly given
remedy; only in the rarest cases of unique goods would a common law judge
entertain SP.122 Although high from the perspective of the common law, this
rate is low vis-à-vis damage awards, which is not what one would expect to
see in a remedial scheme where both types of remedies are considered
ordinary (choice of claimant). Logically, there are two factors behind the low
percentage: non-breaching parties choose damages as their preferred remedy
and judges disfavor SP as a remedy of choice. The first factor can be
explained as a reasonable outcome in relatively efficient markets for fungible
goods and the higher transaction costs related to compelling performance.
Therefore, the claim for damages is the more efficient and rational decision.
Another explanation is that due to the structure of Chinese society and the
importance of non-legal norms based on Confucian and socialisticcommunitarian values, reputational effects play a large role in the regulation
of breach of contract.123 To breach a contract dishonors the non-breaching
party who then would no longer want to have further contact with the
breaching party. Payment of damages, along with creation of negative
reputational effects, would be viewed as just punishment from the
perspective of the aggrieved party. The second factor, judicial intervention,
will be discussed below.
The ancillary question to the percentage of SP orders in various types
of contract disputes is whether the overall low level of use of SP as a remedy
is statistically associated with a number of variables including the category
of contract, the likelihood of SP being considered, and whether a judge, upon
addressing a taxonomy of contracts at the preliminary stages, actively
persuades a party to change its claim from SP to damages.
The rationale for including Q8 in the questionnaire was to determine
122

U.C.C. § 2-716(1) provides that: “[s]pecific performance may be decreed where the
goods are unique . . .”; it also provides that even when the goods are not considered to be
unique SP may still be possible in cases where “[t]he buyer has a right of replevin for goods
identified to the contract if after reasonable effort the buyer is unable to effect cover for such
goods.” See U.C.C. § 2-716(1) (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2010).
123 See Larry A. DiMatteo, ‘Rule of Law’ in China: The Confrontation of Formal Law with
Cultural Norms, 51 CORNELL INT’L L. J. 392, 417 (2018) (“China has a long history of nonformal customary law that still plays a role in business practice as well as how contracts are
viewed as a private ordering instrument. Confucian norms also deter resorting to the court
system as a method of resolving contract disputes.”).
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whether judges were more likely to consider the merits of awarding SP based
on the general taxonomy of contracts.124 If a judge willingly and actively
addresses the taxonomy of contracts, then certain types of contracts (such as
partnership agreements) would be considered incompatible with SP. This is
notable as it suggests that judges may form an opinion about the available
remedies appropriate for a claim before the beginning of the proceedings.
This is especially important in civil law countries where SP is supposedly an
ordinary remedy that should be applied irrespective of contract type.
Thus, in the context of transaction types, it is likely that a judge would
consider persuading a claimant to change a claim for SP to a claim of
damages for some types of contracts during the preliminary phases of the
litigation (pre-trial) (Q7). Therefore, the survey explores statistical
associations between responses and factors indicative of a proactive
preliminary judicial posture, as well as ferreting out judges’ general attitude
toward SP. Figure 4 shows the percentage of positive responses to the
question of whether a judge feels the need to address a taxonomy of contracts
when deciding whether to consider a SP order.
Figure 4
Responses to Q8 by Levels of Court
(felt need to consider taxonomy of contracts)

Figure 4 demonstrates the distribution of responses to Q8 across each
124

See supra Figure 2.
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level of courts. About half of the Trial and High Courts (50% and 52.9%) felt
it necessary to consult an accepted taxonomy of contracts when evaluating a
claim for SP. Notably, 64% of the Intermediate Courts’ judges considered
the type of contract as an important factor in deciding on SP. Again, the
higher percentage of appellate court judges engaging taxonomy of contracts
models is explainable by the quality of such judges, who are more
sophisticated and experienced in understanding the variations between
categories of contracts and the corresponding contractual disputes, as
compared to the judges at the Trial Court level.125
There are numerous institutional factors that partially account for the
lower percentage of Trial Court judges relying on the taxonomy of contracts
in issuances of SP. The major institutional factor is the procedural emphasis
placed on negotiation and mediation at the Trial Court level.126 It is in this
area that judges may persuade the disputing parties to agree to a damage
settlement. Verdict (Pan Jue) and ruling (Cai Ding) are two standard forms
of judicial decisions in China. Verdict is the default way of making a
decision, a consequence of adjudication. A ruling is based on the consent of
the litigants, in which they agree to waive their rights to appeal.127 A ruling
is a consequence of judicial mediation and negotiation. If the litigants agree
to a ruling, their litigation fees are cut in half.128 In practice, many judges
prefer offering rulings than rendering verdicts.129 This is because by giving a
ruling they avoid the risks of retrial, which increases their workload and
possibly causes them to suffer lower performance ratings if their verdicts are
found in error by higher courts.
An interview with Judge W, a quota judge from High Court H, was
especially revealing.130 Judge W has been presiding over contractual disputes
for more than eight years. Regarding contract types and SP he stated:
“…while High Court judges also hope to settle a case via mediation, I am
mindful of the different judicial attitude[s] that different types of contracts
tend to receive before I consider awarding SP in a given case.” The practice
125

With the introduction of the Quota Judge System by the SPC, only a person who is
qualified as a judge is allowed to hear the case. The higher courts have a higher standard than
lower courts in selecting quota judges. For example, the Guangdong High People’s Court did
not recruit any quota judges who were born after 1981 in 2017. But many Intermediate and
Trial Courts in Guangdong province have recruited quota judges who were born after 1980
with less trial experience. Yulin Fu, Court management in transformation China: A
Perspective of Civil Justice, 6 PEKING U. L. J. 82, 83-84 (2018).
126 Kwai Hang Ng & Xin He, Internal Contradictions of Judicial Mediation in China, 39
L. & SOC. INQUIRY 285, 290 (2014).
127 Chapter VIII of the PRC Civil Procedure Law.
128 诉讼费用交纳办法 [现行有效] [Measures on the Payment of Litigation Costs]
(promulgated by St. Council of People’s Republic of China, Dec. 19, 2006, effective Apr. 1,
2007) at art. 15.
129 Chen, supra note 95, at 114.
130 Interview with Judge W, Quota Judge, High Court H, at her Court office (Dec. 16,
2018).
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of forcing judicial mediation is also found at the High Court level. Judge W
noted that there “are institutional incentives that apply to High Court judges
and encourage us to be proponents of judicial mediation. We also want to
play safe. By that I mean, to close a case via judicial mediation will not only
be taken into account during our performance assessment, but it also makes
the litigants happy.” However, Judge W stressed that the importance of
adjudication over mediation is stronger at the High Court level:
Generally, the cases that make their way to the High Courts have
much at stake. They are extremely costly to both sides, and many of
them are appeal cases; such a confluence of circumstances does not
always lend itself to mediation. We will often try to mediate but we
are concurrently well prepared to adjudicate by delivering a verdict.

Judge W’s commentary and Figure 4 illustrate that High Court judges
are more sensitive to the taxonomy of contracts than judges at lower levels
of courts in China. The practice of court-mandated mediation is especially
strong in the lower courts.131 Thus, if judges prefer to use mediation often to
settle a variety of contract disputes, then it is understandable that they are less
likely to pay heed to the taxonomy of contracts when delivering remedies.
By contrast, judges at the High Courts are more likely than not to adjudicate,
which makes them more sensitive to contract type and more open to SP for
certain types of contracts. It should also be noted that the need or judicial
preference for mediation is less plausible at the appellate court levels, since
it is likely that the parties have already been through multiple rounds of
mediation at the lower court level and had failed to agree to a resolution.132
As noted above, since it is a costly and lengthy process to reach the High
Court level, the disputants have high expectations of obtaining a judicial
resolution (verdict). These factors explain why High Court judges appear to
appreciate and use the taxonomy of contracts analysis more than judges in
the lower courts.

131

Yedan Li, Joris Kocken & Benjamin van Rooij, Understanding China’s Court
Mediation Surge: Insights from a Local Court, 43 L. & SOC. INQUIRY 58, 59-60 (2018).
132 PETER C.H. CHAN, MEDIATION IN CONTEMPORARY CHINESE CIVIL JUSTICE: A
PROCEDURALIST DIACHRONIC 210-12 (2017).
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Figure 5
Responses to Q7 by Levels of Court

Figure 5 above illustrates the relative distribution between the responses
in Q7 (“Have you ever considered attempting to persuade the claiming party
to change a claim for SP to a claim for damages?”). Q7 most directly
addresses the value of SP relative to a claim for damages. The percentage of
judges responding ‘Yes’ to Q7 (Figure 4) did not vary significantly across
the court system (p=0.8720). It is posed that if a judge is willing to actively
persuade a claimant to change its claim for damages to one for SP, then the
judge, taking into account various factors and benefitting from prior judicial
experience, has come to recognize that SP is not suitable or feasible in some
types of cases. Notably, over 55% of the surveyed judges in the Intermediate
Courts and roughly 52% of judges in the High Courts consider persuading
claimants to change their claim to damages. However, only about 40% of the
judges in the Trial Courts would consider it appropriate to try and dissuade a
claimant to pursue SP.
As with the use of a taxonomy of contracts analysis, it seems the lower
rate of judicial influence in the choice of remedy in the lower courts is in part
due to their lack of experience, along with the time constraints related to
heavy caseloads (leaving judges with little time or interest in persuading a
party to change its chosen remedy). For those cases that appear unworthy of
or inappropriate for awarding SP, experienced judges attempt to persuade
claimants to change their remedial requests prior to the beginning of an
official court hearing. It is in the best interests of all parties, including the
court, to counsel the claimant to seek damages when the likelihood of being
granted an order of SP is slight. This is especially true when a claimant seeks
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the sole remedy of SP in its summons.133
Figure 6 below shows that Trial Court judges’ responses to Question 8
(Q8) (“In your experience, do you find a need to address a taxonomy of
contracts when you decide whether to consider a SP order?”) were
significantly correlated to positive responses to Q7. The percentage of Trial
Court judges selecting ‘Yes’ in response to Q8 and Q7 was 64.9%.134
Figure 6
Trial Courts Cross Tabulation by Response to Question 7 with
Reference to Question 8
Trial Courts:
Question 7
Question Text
Need to address
Q8
taxonomy? n (%)

No (N=140) Yes (N=94)

Total

P=value
<0.001

No

84 (60)

33 (35.1)

117 (50)

Yes

56 (40)

61 (64.9)

117 (50)

Total

140

94

234

These findings indicate that where a Trial Court judge felt it was
important to pursue a taxonomy of contracts analysis in considering whether
to decree an order of SP, she was also more likely to consider persuading a
party to change a claim for SP to a claim for damages.

133

In Chinese civil procedure law, a summons is similar to a statement of claim or
complaint in the common law.
134 64.9 % of those judges who answered ‘yes’ to Q7 also responded ‘yes’ to Q8. 40 per
cent of the judges who answered ‘no’ to Q7 responded ‘yes’ to Q8.

311

Northwestern Journal of
International Law & Business

40:275 (2020)

Figure 7
Intermediate Court Cross Tabulation by Response to Question 7 with
Reference to Question 8

Question
Q8

Text
Need to address a
taxonomy? n (%)
No

Intermediate Courts:
Question 7
No (N=25) Yes (N=27)

Total

P=value
0.002

17 (70.8)

7 (25.9)

24 (47.1)

Yes

7 (29.2)

20 (74.1)

27 (52.9)

Total

24

27

51

Figure 7 above shows that in the Intermediate Courts, the responses to
Q8 were significantly associated with the responses to Q7. The percentage of
Intermediate Court judges selecting ‘Yes’ in response to Q8 and Q7 was
74.1%.
As with the Trial Courts, these findings indicate that where an
Intermediate Court judge felt it was important to address the taxonomy of
contracts in considering whether to decree an order of SP, the judge was more
likely to consider persuading a party to change its claim for SP to a claim for
damages.
Figure 8 below shows that the percentage of High Court judges selecting
‘Yes’ in response to Q8 did not vary significantly with the response to Q7.
However, while 71.7% of High Court judges who answered ‘Yes’ to Q8 also
answered ‘Yes’ to Q7, the findings failed to reach statistical significance
(p=0.11).135

135 This is most likely due to our modest sample size and the rather even distribution of
responses to Q8 by judges who answered ‘No’ to Q7.
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Figure 8
High Court Cross Tabulation by response to Question 7 with
Reference to Question 8
High Court:
Question 7
Question
8

Text

No (N=38) Yes (N=47)

Total

Need to address a
taxonomy? n (%)
No

17 (45.9)

13 (28.3)

30 (36.1)

Yes

20 (54.1)

33 (71.7)

53 (63.9)

Total

37

46

83

P=value
0.11

Despite the lack of statistical significance, it is important to note that the
High Court judges were more likely than not to try to persuade a claimant to
change its claim from SP to damages. Further, regardless of their response to
Q7, the High Court judges were substantially more partial to consulting the
taxonomy of contracts when considering an award of specific performance.
3. Availability of Specific Performance
If SP is seldom awarded, what are the underlying reasons or rationales
for its frugal use? Under what circumstances is the remedy of SP likely to be
granted and under what circumstances will its use be restricted? In exploring
these questions, the concern over high transaction costs as a factor was
explored by Question 9 (Q9) (“Do the supervision costs of enforcement
factor heavily in making your decision on remedies?”). Secondly, the survey
examined the association between Q2 (level of court) and Q9 in order to
assess whether the concern for supervision costs varied between the levels of
the court system. Next, the association between Q7 and Q9 was examined.
Comparing the responses from Q7 to those in Q9 allows for a determination
of whether supervision costs were a significant factor for judges who were
strongly for or against awarding SP.
Figure 9 below reveals the distribution of responses regarding Q9 across
the levels of the court system. The results did not support the hypothesis that
supervision or enforcement costs are a prominent factor in judges’ decisions
to award SP as we surmised. But it is still a relevant factor because overall,
51.7% of surveyed judges viewed supervision costs as prohibitive in forming
their decision to award SP. Perhaps more surprisingly, almost 43.1% of High
Court judges responded that they did not feel that supervision costs were a
factor in their decisions on whether to award SP. At the Trial Court level,
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only 52.3% of judges felt that supervision costs were an important factor,
while 59.8% of judges in the Intermediate Courts viewed supervision costs
as a major concern. However, it should be noted that the Intermediate Courts
make up n=85 (22.8%) of the total sample size (n=373), and as a result,
should be viewed with some reservation.
Figure 9
Responses to Q9 by Levels of Court

These results are surprising because of the view that the costs in time
and money of supervising the implementation of a SP order was thought to
be by far the strongest rationale for awarding damages instead of SP. This
was not the case. If the enforcement process is difficult and unduly lengthy,
there is a high probability that a court would decline to issue a SP order.
Some insights can be gleaned from an interview conducted with Judge Z, a
Trial Court judge.136 Judge Z graduated from one of the most prestigious law
schools in China and has been working in the Civil Tribunal of his court since
2012. Below are excerpts from the interview:
Q: Do you consider the supervision costs of enforcement as one of the
reasons affecting your decision to award SP?
A: No… sometimes… but, no.

136

314

Interview with Judge Z, Trial Court Judge, at his Court office (Dec. 12, 2018).
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Q: You seem unsure of this. Are you certain the answer is “no”?
A: As a Trial Court judge, we are often overwhelmed by the volume
of our caseload. As you have perhaps heard, the Chinese courts are
often confronted with what we term ‘litigation explosion.’ In theory,
we need to consider the supervision costs, but in practice, we simply
cannot afford to consider it because we are under immense pressure
to conclude the claim and move on to the next one. Under the Chinese
Civil Procedure Law, we are required to complete the proceedings by
delivering the judgment within six months of it being docketed. For
cases applying summary procedures, which amount to the large bulk
of cases at a trial court, we have to complete the entire claim within
three months. I, personally, have been assigned 310 cases in the last
year alone. As you might imagine, the simple math requires that I must
issue judgments on an almost daily basis.
Q: So, would [you] say that the heavy caseload bars you from
considering supervision costs as a factor?
A: Certainly. More than that, if you look at the variety, volume and
nature of the tasks judges confront on a day-to-day basis, including
administrative and routine activities, such as the mandatory half-day
political study every week, you will appreciate that Chinese judges’
work environment and Chinese court’s social function are very
different from other jurisdictions [countries].
Q: I understand. But what if your SP order requires particularly high
supervision costs in order for it to be enforced? Put differently, will
your performance appraisal be affected if your SP order has proven
very difficult to enforce?
A: No.
Q: Why?
A: First, it comes down to the internal organizational structure of the
court and compartmentalization. The trial units handle the hearings
and deliver judgments. There is an entirely different unit that is
responsible for the supervision and enforcement of judgments.
Therefore, at the trial unit, we do not concern ourselves with the way
in which a difficult judgment is enforced. The only exception to this
is when a case involves an administrative petition (XINFANG).137
Second, as a trial judge, my concerns stem from the possibility of one
of my judicial decisions being reversed rather than any potential
supervision or enforcement issues. Therefore, as you can likely
appreciate, the supervision and enforcement is not officially part of

137 Xinfang or Administrative Petitioning (also known as letters and visits) is the
administrative system for hearing complaints and grievances from individuals in the PRC.
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my duties or performance appraisal scheme.138 So why should I let it
factor into what I view is a prudent remedy?

To reinforce the discourse above, Judge Z’s explanation of indifference
to awarding damages or SP relates mostly to the structural division of work
assignments in the Chinese courts139 and current judicial reform policies.140
Thus, concerns about additional transaction costs of SP are not captured as a
factor in decision-making at the Trial Court level because the adjudicating
divisions are separate from the judgment enforcement division. More
tellingly, adjudicating judges are far more concerned about the potential of
their decisions being overturned by the appellate courts than whether the
decisions prove difficult to enforce. Nevertheless, the problem of judgments
being issued by the lower Chinese courts proving difficult to enforce has
begun to attract attention. There are now several campaigns underway aimed
at minimizing the difficulties of enforcement. The SPC has established a
special website on “resolving judgment enforcement problems.”141
4. Probability of Obtaining Specific Performance as an Anchor in
Settlement Negotiations
Will defendants be more amenable to agreeing to pay damages where it
appears the claimant has a plausible likelihood of obtaining SP? The last
analysis examines the willingness of defendants to settle for damages to
avoid being compelled to perform part of a contract. Question 11 (“In your
experience, when a SP order is requested by the claimant, how often [do]
you find that the defendant would like to settle the case before you decree a
SP order? Please indicate a percentage from 0-100%”) tests the propensity
138

Chinese courts have developed a performance appraisal system to measure judges’
performance. According to the Chinese Judges Law, the court will reward and punish judges
based on the appraisal results. “The Guiding Opinion on Carrying out the Case Quality
Evaluation Work” issued by SPC in 2008 and revised in 2011, stipulates how the SPC assesses
the performance of courts at all levels nationwide. The appraisal system consists of 31
performance indicators, which are divided into three categories: trial fairness, trial efficiency,
and trial effect. See Guodong Du & Meng Yu, Performance Appraisal: A Decisive Factor in
Chinese Judges’ Behavior Patterns, CHINA JUSTICE OBSERVER (Feb. 21, 2019),
https://www.chinajusticeobserver.com/insights/performance-appraisal-a-decisive-factor-inchinese-judges-behavior-patterns.html.
139 Within the Chinese Courts at all levels, a judgment enforcement department (JED) is
responsible for organizing and handling enforcement work. JED is not an independent
governmental agency but an internal department in the Court. However, JED is a separate
internal unit from the trail units within a court. JEDs of Chinese courts at the primary and
intermediate levels undertake most enforcement work.
140 The Third-round Judicial Reform during 2014-2017 initiated by SPC introduced a
judicial accountability system, which means that “he who has tried the case shall decide the
case, and he who makes the judgment shall be held accountable”; see also SPC REPORT,
http://www.court.gov.cn/zixun-xiangqing-66802.html (last visited Mar. 24, 2020).
141 See SUPREME PEOPLE’S COURT OF THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA, http://jszx.court.
gov.cn/main/ExecuteDynamic.jhtml (last visited Jan. 26, 2020).
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of defendants to pay damages in cases were the rationales for SP are strong.
The responses answered as a percentage have been categorized into quartiles.
The responses are also presented according to the level of the court system.
The point of interest was whether defendants’ willingness to settle in cases
where there was a strong probability of the issuance of a SP order changed
depending on the level of the court system. The results of the likelihood of
settlement in cases where SP is requested are summarized in Figure 10.
Figure 10
Q11: SP and Settlement by Level of Court142

The distribution shows that overall, the three levels of courts’ mean
values for Q11 (Intermediate 31.5%, Trial 32.6%, High 31.6%) were not
significantly different (p=0.96) and none of the pairwise contrasts were
significant. Essentially, what this illustrates is that there were no significant
differences between the defendants’ propensity to settle across the levels of
the court system. One might have expected to see defendants more motivated
to settle by paying damages at the Trial Court level. However, defendants
were as unlikely to settle in the trial courts as they were in the intermediate
or high courts.
The correlation between the claimants’ request for SP and defendants’
willingness to pay damages was not as strong as expected. The rate of the
judges’ belief that defendants were more open to settlement when a SP order
was requested ranged from 31.5% to 32.6% as noted above. Once again, this
142 Boxes are determined by the first and third quartiles and whiskers extend to the
maximum, minimum, and a horizontal line at the midpoint of each box indicates the median.
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low percentage is likely due to the perception of whether the request for SP
was perceived as having a high likelihood of success. For example, the
correlation between a request for SP and settlement would likely be more
statistically significant in cases involving real estate because of the higher
rate of SP in those types of cases.
The empirical survey shows that although Chinese contract law
replicates civil law’s indifference between the remedies of damages and SP,
in practice the law resembles a hybrid between the civil law’s indifference
and the common law’s view that SP is the remedy of last resort. This is seen
in the Chinese courts’ creation of a number of rules of thumb or heuristics143
restricting the availability of SP in certain cases. First, in cases where it is
reasonable for the non-breaching party to obtain substituted goods, a
claimant’s request for SP is considered to be unreasonable.144 Because of the
higher transaction costs of SP, cover145 or purchase of substituted goods may
be considered within the non-breaching party’s duty to mitigate damages.
Furthermore, the failure to mitigate damages is viewed as an act of bad
faith146 or commercial unreasonableness that precludes the granting of SP.147
Failure to mitigate or bad faith acts are especially likely to be recognized in
cases where the breaching party’s costs of performing are considerably
higher than the non-breaching party’s costs of purchasing substituted goods.
Second, courts often weigh whether the enforcement of an order of SP would
be “difficult and unduly lengthy.”148 Again, if it were more cost effective for
the non-breaching party to purchase substituted goods and recover damages
then the compelling of performance through SP would be considered
unreasonable.
V. BUILDING A DESCRIPTIVE THEORY OF CONTRACTUAL
REMEDIES
The empirical survey shows that in practice, there is limited use of SP
as a remedy compared to the widespread use of damages. The purpose of the
143

Availability of Specific Remedies, supra note 20, at 31-33.
Id. at 32 (“[I]t has been generally acknowledged among the Chinese academic
community and in the courts that [SP] cannot be claimed if a substitute transaction can be
reasonably obtained.”), cited in Sun Liangguo, The Realization of Expectation Interest: A
Study of Substitute Transaction, 6 CONTEMP. L. REV. (2009)); see also HAN, supra note 4, at
612.
145 The right to cover is a common legal term for the buyer buying substitute goods after
breach of contract. See, e.g., U.C.C. § 2-712(1) (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2010)
(“After a breach . . . the buyer may ‘cover’ by making in good faith and without unreasonable
delay any reasonable purchase of or contract to purchase goods in substitution for those due
from the seller.”).
146 The duty of good faith in Chinese contract law as applied by the Chinese courts plays
an outsized role in judicial interpretation of contracts and application of contract rules. See
DiMatteo, supra note 124, at 428-40.
147 Availability of Specific Remedies, supra note 20, at 32.
148 Id. at 37.
144
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empirical survey was to determine if SP was indeed treated as an ordinary
remedy and, if not, why. The empirical findings presented here support the
claim that SP under Chinese law, despite the clarity of its formal law, is
viewed as an unattractive and less commonly used remedy than is assumed.
This part and the next offer two theories—one descriptive and the other
normative—to account for the frugal use of SP in Chinese law.
As noted earlier, contract remedies are divided into two types: damages
and non-monetary. The non-monetary remedies include SP, injunctions,
termination of contracts (common law rescission), and adjustment of
contracts (common law reformation).149 A major divergence between civil
and common law is their treatment of the SP remedy. The civil law does not
formally prioritize damage and non-damage remedies, while the common
law gives priority to the awarding of damages over the remedy of SP. A
number of rationales have been offered to justify the equality of SP and
damages in civil law remedies: (1) the availability of specific performance is
justified from a moral point of view (people ought to keep their promises);
(2) specific performance is a right, rather than a remedy, therefore parties to
a contract are entitled to request specific performance; (3) damages are
under-compensatory, for example, some losses that are not compensated for
include emotional distress, loss of time, speculative damages, and in some
cases the recovery of legal costs; and (4) the availability of specific
performance enhances efficiency (honoring the non-breaching party the
preference as to remedy).150
Because of the history of the two-court system in common law
jurisdictions, contractual remedies were bifurcated. The English or royal
courts, and then later the law courts, were only able to issue awards of
damages. The ecclesiastical or church courts, and later the courts of equity or
chancery,151 were only able to award non-monetary remedies, such as SP.
However, the two court systems eventually merged.152 Today, law courts can
149 Injunctions are more prevalent in areas such as tort law, such in cases of trespass or
nuisance, and in the infringement of intellectual property rights. Reformation and rescission
are found in both the civil and common laws. The major difference in their use is the civil
law’s concern for contractual equilibrium. In German law, if the contract becomes out of
balance (parties’ valuations of costs and benefits at the time of contract formation) subsequent
to the conclusion of the contract due to some unexpected event, which causes a hardship on
one of the parties, then the parties are under a duty to renegotiate to place the contract back
into equilibrium. The common law has no such principle. Thus, judicial termination or
adjustment of the contract is more common in the civil law.
150 Chen, supra note 96, at 100; Herman, supra note 7, at 212-13 (“If we look back over
centuries of judicial decisions ordering specific performance, the claim of economic
inefficiency of specific performance seems a modern gloss . . .”).
151 “The most important historical limitation grew out of the circumstance that the
chancellor [ecclesiastical courts and then court of equity] had originally granted equitable
relief in order to supply the deficiencies of the common law. . . When during the long
jurisdictional struggle between the two systems of courts.” Farnsworth supra note 15 at 16364.
152 The Supreme Judicature Act of 1873 ended the competitive, separate law and equity
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award any type of remedy. However, the old bifurcation of remedies was
transplanted into the unitary court system with legal remedies (damages)
being prioritized as the ordinary remedy and equitable remedies (SP)
relegated to the non-preferred status of extraordinary remedies. The
difference between viewing SP in the civil law as an available or primary
remedy in all cases (claimant’s choice) versus the common law’s view that
damages should always be awarded unless they prove to be inadequate
(judicial choice) has been considered one of the major differences between
the two legal systems.153 Clearly this is the case when comparing formal law,
but is it the case in practice? Do the two systems converge, that is, reach
similar outcomes? The empirical survey presented in Part IV takes an initial
step to answer these questions in the case of Chinese civil law. The findings
conclude that in the Chinese court system there has been a convergence of
the civil and common law approaches to SP as a remedy. This part offers a
descriptive theory that explains this convergence.
A. Specific Performance is not an Ordinary Remedy After All
The percentage of court decisions in which a SP order was issued was
relatively small. Judges at the trial court level were frugal in using SP as a
remedy, with 59.4% of the judges answering that they used the remedy in
less than 10% of their cases.154 The rate was higher at the appellate levels
with 61% of the Intermediate Court and 64.6% of High Court judges issuing
SP orders above 10% of the time.155 Unfortunately, the survey was simplified
courts in England. In 1873, Parliament passed the Judicature Act, which merged common law
courts and courts of equity. Although one of the Divisions of the High Court is still called
Chancery, all courts could now administer both equity and common law with equity to reign
supreme in any dispute. S.C. of Judicature Act, 36 & 37 Vict. c. 66 (1873). The merging of
the courts in the United States began with New York State’s adoption of the “Field Code” in
1848. The Field Code provided a single law that today we simply recognize as civil procedure
for all courts, essentially merging the law and equity courts into a single court system in which
parties could request legal and equitable remedies. Rudiments of the old dual system still
survey. In the United States, the states of Delaware, Mississippi, New Jersey, South Carolina,
and Tennessee preserve the distinctions between law and equity and between courts of law
and courts of equity. See Mildred Coe & Lewis Morse, Chronology of the Development of the
David Dudley Field Code, 27 CORNELL L. REV. 238 (1942) (discussing the adoption of the
Field Code in New York); see also Kellen Funk, The Influence of the Field Code, WORDPRESS
(Sept.
1,
2014),
http://kellenfunk.org/field-code/the-influence-of-the-field-code-anintroduction (showing the spread of the Field Code throughout the U.S.).
153 Claims to Performance and Their Enforcement, in KONRAD ZWEIGERT & HEIN KÖTZ,
INTRODUCTION TO COMPARATIVE LAW 479 (Tony Weir trans., 3d ed. 1998) (“In both German
and French law . . . a contractor [party to contract] is in principle entitled to demand that his
contract be performed in specie [SP]. The standpoint of the Common Law is quite different: if
a contractor does not do as he promised, the innocent party’s only right, in general, is to bring
a claim for breach of contract . . . and which always leads to monetary compensation or
damages.”).
154 See supra Figure 2.
155 Id.
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to increase the response rate. It did accomplish this goal, but at the cost of
more granulated findings. Therefore, no mean percentage can be provided
for all cases granting SP to the total number of cases. However, using the
responses of the Trial Court judges, which had a larger sample size than the
other two levels of courts (219 Trial judges to 72 Intermediate judges to 48
Higher Court judges) some conclusions may still be reached. The fact that
62% of the judges granted SP in less than 10% of the cases for breach of
contract, including 9% of judges that had never issued a SP order, strongly
indicates that it is not a preferred remedy and, in fact, is infrequently granted
despite the formal law’s treatment of SP as an equal or preferred remedy.156
The low rate of the use of SP may be due to party or claimant preference for
the remedy of damages or the lack of availability of SP (judicial choice). The
limited use of SP is likely due to a combination of these factors. Either way,
SP is not a popular remedy from the perspectives of claimants and judges.
B. Taxonomy of Contracts: Not All Contract Breaches are Ordinary
Supposedly, the courts should turn a blind eye to the type of contract or
subject matter of the contract under the civil law. The type of transaction,
whether for the sale of goods or sale of real estate, should have no bearing on
the judicial decision to order SP. In the common law, this is not the case. The
starting point is that, in most cases, SP is to be denied and provable damages
awarded. SP is reserved for cases of contracts involving unique subject
matters, such as a one-of-a-kind item, like real estate, paintings, or
antiques.157 This difference in civil and common law reasoning on the proper
use of the remedy of SP is not clear in Chinese case law.
Although SP is most prominent in breaches relating to real estate
contracts, the rate of SP orders issued was only 24.02% in those cases.158 It
would be expected that a seller’s failure to transfer property would elicit
many more SP orders. The second most common area where SP orders were
issued involved sale of goods contracts at the rate of 10.18%.159 On one hand,
this rate seems to be low for a civil law system, but on the other hand it would
be considered a high rate in the common law. The modest rate of SP orders
in Chinese cases involving the sale of goods is likely due to the fungibility
of goods. If there are readily available secondary markets for the goods being
sold in the contract, then the buyer is likely to purchase the goods elsewhere
and then sue for damages, assuming the cover price is above the contract
price. This approach is simply the most efficient method of obtaining relief
156 “Where a party fails to perform a non-monetary obligation or if his performance of the
non-monetary obligation is not in conformity with the agreement, the other party may demand
performance . . .” CCL, art. 107.
157 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 360, cmt. b (“Some types of interests are by
their very nature incapable of being valued in money. Typical examples include heirlooms,
family treasures and works of art that induce a strong sentimental attachment.”).
158 See supra Figure 3.
159 Id.
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and to mitigate damages. SP is more likely to be used in contracts involving
customized goods or when there is no efficient secondary market to purchase
substituted goods. More importantly, the low percentage of SP orders in sale
of goods contracts is likely also due to the courts using taxonomy of contracts
approach. In cases where substitute goods are easily available, along with the
high transaction costs of implementing or monitoring a SP order, a court is
likely to suggest that the claimant withdraw its request for SP in favor of
damages. If the claimant does not withdraw his demand for SP, the court will
deny the claim for SP under the rationale that the claimant did not honor his
duty to mitigate damages, or by reasoning that the demand for SP is
unreasonable.
The importance of the influence of the type of transaction to the
determination of the need or reasonableness of SP was also shown by the
responses to the direct question of whether the judges overtly use the
taxonomy of transaction approach. Across the three court levels, over 50%
of all judges expressly stated that the type of transaction was a consideration
in their deciding whether to grant of SP.160 The use of a taxonomy of contracts
by Chinese courts comes close to the common law approach that SP is only
to be used for certain types of contracts.
The percentage of SP orders in other types of contracts are exceedingly
low, ranging from 0.95% for partnership agreement disputes to 2.37% for
service contract disputes to 7.10% for leasing contract disputes.161 Again,
these very low rates of SP for these types of contract disputes are likely due
to multiple factors—claimants’ preference for money damages and courts
viewing SP as an unreasonable or unfair remedy. In sum, taken as a whole,
the rates of the use of the remedy of SP are lower than what would be
expected in a system where the law does not prioritize remedies. It is also
clear that a major predictor of successfully obtaining a SP order in China is
the type of transaction that is at the center of the contract dispute.162
Finally, a substantial percentage of judges responded that they would
consider issuing a SP order in cases where there is only a claim for
damages.163 The point of inquiry here, is whether a judge would consider SP
on her own accord, even though the non-breaching is making a claim for
damages. Again, this fits the scenario represented by the influence of the
taxonomy of contracts approach. In cases such as real estate sales, the
transaction costs of enforcing the SP order are minimal. If the defendant does
not voluntarily transfer the property, the court could simply order the local
administrative office to effectuate the transfer. Additionally, damages would
160

See supra Figure 4. The rates of judges using the taxonomy of contracts approach are
as follows: 50% for Trial Courts, 52.9% for Intermediate Courts, and 63.9% for High Courts.
161 See supra Figure 3.
162 Id.
163 See supra Figure 5. The rates of judges willing to consider issuing SP in cases in which
the remedy was not requested were 40.2% for Trial Courts, 51.9% for Intermediate Courts,
and 55.3% for High Courts.
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be difficult to calculate given the uniqueness of the subject matter. The
importance of the type of contract is also supported by the substantial
correlation between responses to Q7 (judicial choice of SP) and Q8
(taxonomy of contracts).164 This correlation suggests that judges attempt to
align the type of contract with the most appropriate remedy. Again, in the
sale of real estate, a judge may view SP as the most reasonable and efficient
remedy despite the claimant’s request for damages.
C. Inefficiency of Specific Performance Remedy
It is often assumed, especially in the common law world, that SP is an
inefficient remedy. The awarding of damages is preferred since the court can
simply make the award within the confines of the court, while the
enforcement of SP may involve the court in additional monitoring or legal
proceedings. In short, SP enforcement entails higher transactions costs to the
courts, especially considering their busy workloads. This was borne out in
the survey’s findings of law rates of issuance of SP orders. This assumption
was the basis for Q9: “Do the supervision costs of enforcement factor heavily
in making your decision on remedies?” The findings falsified the hypothesis
that higher transaction costs were an important factor in denying requests for
SP. Surprisingly, only 47.3% of judges across the three levels of the court
system felt that supervision (transaction) costs were a factor in deciding on
whether to issue an order of SP. This percentage is lower than the rate
expected, but the rate is substantial enough to support the thesis that the cost
of enforcing SP orders is a factor. The findings may be skewed since judges
may be less willing to admit that their decisions are more based upon
procedural or cost saving grounds than on substantive grounds. Also, the
findings support the thesis, explored in Part V, that efficiency is only one
value that courts take in consideration and it may be outweighed by other
values such as good faith, fairness, justice, and equity.
VI. NORMATIVE THEORY OF SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE:
EFFICIENCY AND FAIRNESS
This part discusses the norms and rationales used to justify contract law
and its applications. It begins with the premise that no single norm or theory
can explain all of contract law. The above survey showed that efficiency
(lower transaction costs) was a factor, but not the most important factor in
the decision whether or not to order SP. This part attempts to provide a
framework to show what other values are often influential in the application
of contract law, including the use of remedies. The complexity of contract
law is explainable only through a composite of norms or theories that often
vary based upon the type of contract165 and the legal system or tradition being
164

See supra Figures 6, 7 & 8.
See Larry A. DiMatteo, The Norms of Contracts: The Fairness Inquiry and the “Law
of Satisfaction”—A Nonunified Theory, 24 HOFSTRA L. REV. 349, 445 (1995) (“Professor
165
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studied.166
The first section briefly frames a normative composite theory of
contract law.167 It poses that the normative composite is necessarily fluid in
order to explain all of contract law. The various norms or values are weighed
differently depending on the type of contract, context of the case (facts), and
the legal system in which the norms are recognized. These influences impact
the application of formal law. The normative composite impacts the creation
of contract law (ex ante) and the application of that law to cases (ex post).
A. Contract Law’s Normative Composite
Contract law cannot be explained by a unified theory because it services
a basket of different norms often in conflict with one another.168 Common
norms associated with contract law include freedom of contract, certainty,
predictability, efficiency, justice, fairness, and good faith. As a result of the
complexity and variety of contract types, contract law rules must deal with a
variety of factual contexts in which certain values will be more predominant
than others. Different types of contracts are influenced by ancillary norms.
For example, the rationale behind sales law is the norm of expediency;169 in
more formalized contracts, such as, negotiable instruments and letters of
credit, the ancillary norms would be that of security and trust; in agency
contracts the norm of loyalty plays a large role in the relationship between
principal and agent; in long-term contracts, such as supply, distribution, and
joint venture contracts, relational norms dominate over ex ante freedom of
contract.170
In both civil and common law, freedom of contract is considered the
Hillman asserts that ‘contract law is a complex set of rules and principles.’ As such, the
theoretical underpinnings, by necessity, must reflect that complexity. One may argue that the
complexity of contract law has grown over the years. The sophistication and complexity of
modem commercial transactions have tested the rudiments of classical contract law.” Id. at
445-46 (quoting Robert A. Hillman, The Crisis in Modern Contract Theory, 67 TEX. L. REV.
103, 103 (1988)). The taxonomy of contracts thesis studied in the empirical survey showed
that the type of contract was predictive of the likelihood of obtaining SP.
166 As noted earlier, the civil and common law legal traditions view the remedy of SP and
its use differently. See supra notes 3, 4, 22-25, 144 & accompanying text.
167 DiMatteo, supra note 166, at 451-53.
168 Robert Hillman states: “The problem of many theories of contract, however, is that
attempts to reduce contract to a simple abstraction leave too much unexplained or distort too
much to fit the theory.” Robert A. Hillman, The Crisis in Modern Contract Theory, 67 TEX.
L. REV. 103, 122-23 (1988).
169 For example, the requirement of prompt notice of non-conformity under CISG Article
39 or the right of the buyer to reject goods for minor defects under UCC Section 2-601. In the
area of remedies, the CISG and the UCC provide simple damage calculations based upon the
differentials between contract price, market price, and the price of substituted goods.
170 Ian R. Macneil, Contracts: Adjustment of Long-Term Economic Relations under
Classical and Neoclassical, and Relational Contract Law, 72 NW. U. L. REV. 854, 890 (1980)
(“In a truly relational approach [to contracts] the reference point is the entire relation as it had
developed to the time of the change in question.”).
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dominant norm of contract law. This is, of course, how it must be since
contracts are private law, reflective of the idiosyncratic preferences and
values of the contracting parties. The free market system rests upon private
parties’ freedom to pursue personal self-interests through contracts.
However, because of the sometimes-high degree of disparity between the
characteristics of the parties, the superior party will overreach and abuse its
freedom of contract. The superior party can be defined as the party with
superior bargaining power, with the advantage of asymmetrical information
and greater sophistication. The outcome of the pseudo-bargain between the
stronger and weaker parties will be judged through contract laws policing
doctrines,171 as well as tailored laws to protect a class of weaker parties, such
as consumers and minors.172 Thus, contract law has always, to various
extents, served two functions—the primary function of the facilitation of
private ordering and the secondary regulatory function of policing injustices
within that private ordering.173 SP can be seen as a means of providing justice
to a weaker party.
Based upon the findings of the empirical survey presented in Part IV, a
theory of SP will be offered based upon the norms of efficiency174 and
fairness.175 The area of contractual remedies necessarily reflects this
normative composite. More importantly, the application of remedies is
influenced by the interrelationship between the basket of norms and the facts
of the case. It is these two norms that represent the core rationales of contract
law—in the creation of its rules and principles, and in their applications to
different factual scenarios. They often sit in counterpoise to one another in
which one must give way to the other in a given case. These core norms also
are representative of other similar norms. Efficiency is related to the
171 Policing doctrines include good faith, unconscionability, duress, misrepresentation, and
mistake.
172 Consumer-specific rules are found in consumer protection laws and in the American
UCC’s special rules in the battle of the forms scenario. See U.C.C. § 2-207(2) (AM. LAW INST.
& UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2010) (“The additional terms are to be construed as proposals for
addition to the contract. Between merchants such terms become part of the contract unless . .
.”) and U.C.C. § 2-719(3) (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2010) for collection of
consequential damages (“Limitation of consequential damages for injury to the person in the
case of consumer goods is prima facie unconscionable but limitation of damages where the
loss is commercial is not.”). Minors are offered special protection in the common law’s
infancy law doctrine, which allows persons under the age of eighteen to void their contracts.
173 Contract law’s regulatory function is found in its policing doctrines: coercion (threat),
misrepresentation, undue influence, and mistake. See Alan Schwartz, Contract Theory and
Theories of Contract Régulation, 92 REVUE D’ÉCONOMIE INDUSTRIELLE 101, 109 (2000)
(“Courts can and should enforce the verifiable terms of contracts, police the contracting
process to deter fraud and duress, and help to supply firms with a common vocabulary to use
when making contracts.”).
174 The efficiency norm is the core theme in the economic analysis of law.
175 See James Gordley, Equality in Exchange, 69 CAL. L. REV. 1587, 1592-1603 (1981)
(highlighting that procedural norms of fairness began to supplant substantive ones as early as
the eighteenth century).
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rationales of freedom of contract (private autonomy), as well as certainty and
predictability of law. Fairness is representative of justice (procedural,
corrective, and distributive), good faith, and equity. The rebalancing of
contractual norms can be seen at work in the taxonomy of contracts studied
in the survey. Different contract types have various normative bases that
influence the court decisions whether or not to grant SP.
The power of the often-conflicting norms of efficiency and fairness vary
across legal systems. English common law, at least in formal law, prizes the
norms of efficiency, especially the importance of the certainty and
predictability of law. It weighs in favor of the formal interpretation of
contracts through plain language meanings. It rejects the duty of good faith
believing that it would bring too much uncertainty to contracts and make law
less predictable. Even though English courts may use the term
unconscionable in their judicial decisions, the English common law rejects
the policing doctrine or principle of unconscionability.176 The United States
also places heightened value on freedom of contract and the strict
enforcement of contractual terms. It rightly or wrongly rejects standard terms
regulations and freely accepts incorporation by reference of standard terms
even in consumer contracts.177 However, United States common law
recognizes the duty of good faith, doctrine of unconscionability, contextual
interpretation of contracts, and the civil law principle of hardship178 (doctrine
176 Lord Halsbury in the 1905 case of Clydebank set that threshold as a stipulated amount
in a liquidated damage clause is determined to be “unconscionable and extravagant, and one
which no Court ought to allow to be enforced.” Clydebank Eng’g & Ship Bldg. Co. v.
Yzquierdo y Castaneda [1905] AC 6 (HL). More recently, the United Kingdom Supreme Court
used the concept of “unconscionable and extravagant.” Cavendish-ParkingEye [2015] UKSC
67 [19]–[35].
177 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 211(1) (1981) (stating that a party has
duty to read the standard terms of a contract; whether the party reads them or understands
them is immaterial. They are enforceable if the party enters into the contract. “[W]here a party
to an agreement signs or otherwise manifests assent to a writing and has reason to believe that
like writings are regularly used to embody terms of agreements of the same type, he adopts
the writing as an integrated agreement with respect to the terms included in the writing.”).
Comment c succinctly states that “standard terms imposed by one party are enforced.”
Incorporation by reference is a common method of including terms or other materials found
in other documents into a contract by simply referencing those terms or documents. Id. at
§211(1) cmt. c. A standard definition of the principle of incorporation by references is “a
doctrine in law: the terms of a contemporaneous or earlier writing, instrument, or document
capable of being identified can be made an actual part of another writing, instrument, or
document by referring to, identifying, and adopting the former as part of the latter”. MERRIAMWEBSTER DICTIONARY, https://www.merriamwebster.com/dictionary/incorporation%20by
%20reference.
178 See, e.g., German Civil Code or Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch [BGB] § 313. Larry A.
DiMatteo, Contractual Excuse Under the CISG: Impediment, Hardship, and the Excuse
Doctrines, 27 PACE INT’L L. REV. 259, 262-63 (2015), citing Dietrich Maskow, Hardship and
Force Majeure, 40 AM. J. COMP. L. 657 (1992) (explaining the difference between force
majeure or impossibility and hardship) (“The longstanding German law doctrine of Störung
der Geschäftsgrundlage (interference with the foundation of the contract), codified in Section
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of impracticability).179
Although on the surface American contract law seems to be a more
balanced reflection of efficiency and fairness than English common law, in
fact, the divergence between the two is more a matter of degree. For example,
the unconscionability doctrine as espoused in law180 applies equally to both
commercial and consumer transactions. In practice, it has mostly been used
in consumer transactions181 and the evidentiary threshold to prove
unconscionability is high.182 The doctrine of impracticability,183 the
American equivalent to German hardship,184 is an empty vessel with very
little content. American courts rarely grant an exemption of liability to a party
from contracts that have become onerously burdensome due to an unexpected
change of circumstances after the contract was formed.
In the area of remedies, common law places an outsized premium on
freedom of contract and private autonomy norms and views damages as the
preferred remedy. Examples of arguments that disfavor SP as a remedy
include Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr.’s adage that contracts do not require
313 of the BGB, allows relief to a party where there has been a ‘fundamental’ change in
circumstances, which would render unfair the enforcement of the contract without the revision
of the parties’ obligations.”).
179 In American law, the principle of hardship is found in the doctrine of impracticability.
See U.C.C. § 2-615 (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2010); RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF CONTRACTS § 261 (1981).
180 U.C.C. § 2-302 (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2010).
181 FARNSWORTH, supra note 15, at 330 (“most of the parties that have successfully invoked
the doctrine of unconscionability have been consumers.”). Farnsworth notes that: “Courts have
generally been chary about using the doctrine of unconscionability to protect merchants and
similar professionals and have declined to apply the doctrine in favor of sophisticated
corporations.’ Id. at 331-32; but see Jane P. Mallor, Unconscionability in Contracts between
Merchants, 40 SW. L. J. 1065, 1088 (1986) (“Although consumers have been the primary
beneficiaries of the doctrine of unconscionability, the case law reveals an increasing tendency
to recognize that commercial parties can be victimized by the same types of bargaining
unfairness that stimulated the rebirth and expansion of unconscionability.”).
182 See Arthur Allen Leff, Unconscionability and the Code: The Emperor’s New Clause,
115 U. PA. L. REV. 485, 531-33 (1967) (a highly influential article, generally adopted by the
courts, requires that a party has to provide evidence of both procedural and substantive
unconscionability). See also FARNSWORTH, supra note 16, at 582-85 (noting the general use of
the procedural-substantive approach to unconscionability).
183 U.C.C. § 2-615 (“Excuse by failure of presupposed conditions [is] . . . not a breach of .
. . duty under a contract for sale if performance as agreed has been made impracticable by the
occurrence of a contingency the non-occurrence of which was a basic assumption on which
the contract was made . . .”).
184 The idea of hardship or an imbalance in the contract (although it is still possible to
perform) is found in German Civil Code or Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch [BGB] § 313. “German
law, however, has recently chosen the path of codification with a clear primacy of judicial
adaptation of contract over discharge: § 313 BGB on ‘hardship’ was added to the German civil
code (Burgerliches Gesetzbuch – BGB) in the course of modernizing the German law of
obligations.” Hannes Rösler, Hardship in German Codified Private Law - In Comparative
Perspective to English, French and International Contract Law, 15 EUR. REV. PRIV. L. 483,
485 (2007).
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performance but merely give each of the parties the right to sue for
damages,185 and Steven Shavell’s assertion of the morality of breach under
an economic analysis of contract law.186
The civil law embraces freedom of contract but also focuses on the
fairness of the exchange. In German law, the duty of good faith places an
outsized role in the interpretation of contracts and the application of contract
law.187 Thus, one-sided, non-customary terms perfunctorily enforced in
common law may be unenforceable in German law as a violation of the duty
of good faith and its standard terms rules.188 The importance of the fairness
of the bargain, whether ex ante or ex post, is demonstrated in the German
hardship doctrine.189 Ex ante fairness is weighed in the interpretation of
contracts through the prism of good faith. Ex post fairness is weighed in the
courts’ determination if a change of circumstances has placed an undue
burden on a party to perform. The normal methodology is for German courts
to affix an equilibrium based upon the agreement at the time of formation
and then to determine if there has been a substantial change in that
equilibrium due to a change of circumstances.190 The courts can then bring
the contractual equilibrium back into balance through the hardship principle.
Under the hardship principle, when a contract becomes significantly
imbalanced then the parties have an implied duty to re-negotiate the contract
to bring it back into equilibrium.191 If a party fails to use reasonable efforts
to negotiate an adjustment or reformation of the contract, the court may view
that as an act of bad faith. In the end, this results in German contract law
being more relational in nature, meaning the parties are likely to agree to an
adjustment in cases of true hardship given the expectation of acting in good
faith. This type of forced renegotiation and judicial intervention to re-balance
a contract ex post is anathema to the common law, where the courts have a
negative obligation to rescue parties to contracts that have become one-sided.
185

See Holmes, supra note 16, at 462.
See Shavell, supra note 12.
187 Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch [BGB] [Civil Code], § 242.
188 The German BGB, unlike the American U.C.C., has specific provisions restricting the
enforceability of standard terms: Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch [BGB] [Civil Code], §§ 305 (places
some requirement for incorporating standard terms), 305(c) (standard terms are “so unusual
that the other party to the contract with the user need not expect to encounter them, do not
form part of the contract”), 308 and 309 (listing a number of prohibited (unenforceable)
terms).
189 BÜRGERLICHES GESETZBUCH [BGB] [CIVIL CODE],) § 275, para. 2, sentence 1,
translation at http://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/englisch_bgb/index.html (Ger.) (“The
obligor may refuse performance to the extent that performance requires expense and effort
which, taking into account the subject matter of the obligation and the requirements of good
faith, is grossly disproportionate to the interest in performance of the obligee.”).
190 Id. (“[P]erformance requires expense and . . . is grossly disproportionate to the interest
in performance of the obligee.”).
191 In referring to BGB § 313, one scholar states that “further instruments are needed to
address changed circumstances that fundamentally alter the equilibrium of the contract.”
Rösler, supra note 185, at 485.
186
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This idea of equilibrium of contract is found, in a much more modest
way, in the common law’s use of SP. Since SP evolved out of equity law, a
prerequisite for obtaining a SP order is that the contract itself must be
equitable.192 The common law courts do not hesitate in giving damages based
on a severely one-sided contract, meaning that often the beneficiary of a onesided contract is the non-breaching party who is able to collect damages
based on the contract’s one-sidedness. However, if that party seeks the
remedy of SP, it will be denied because of the contract’s one-sidedness.
The idea of types of contracts or taxonomy of contracts, or what Karl
Llewellyn called transaction-types,193 is based on the notion that over time
contracts become differentiated from one another in categories or pathways
of contracting. So, contracts will be readily recognized as a sale of goods,
sale of real estate, franchise, or agency contracts, and so forth. And, each type
of contract will possess its own normative structure including various
customary practices, usages, and standard terms. The type of contract will
also be a factor in determining the appropriate remedy in cases of breach. In
sum, the empirical survey provided the importance of the categorizing
(taxonomy) contracts in courts’ decisions to provide the remedy of SP,
especially in the Chinese court system. This proposition will be explored
further in the next section.
B. Specific Performance in Chinese Contract Practice
The above discussion of the normative underpinnings of contract law
can be used to better understand the use of SP in Chinese courts. The Chinese
legal system is characterized as a type of civil law, but it is important to note
that the common law has also influenced the creation of modern Chinese
law.194 The history of Chinese law shows that the Chinese courts are
comfortable in following the decisions of other courts, which resembles the
notion of the law of precedents (stare decisis) that is the core feature of
common law.195 There is strong evidence of a common-law style of legal
system, based upon panwen (written legal documents, judgments or
192

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 364(1)(c) (1981) (“Specific performance . . .
will be refused if such relief would be unfair because . . . the exchange is grossly inadequate
or the terms of the contract are otherwise unfair.”).
193 Alan Schwartz, Karl Llewellyn and the Origins of Contract Theory, in THE
JURISPRUDENTIAL FOUNDATIONS OF CORPORATE AND COMMERCIAL LAW 15 (Jody Kraus &
Steven eds., 2000) (summarizing Llewellyn’s analysis of transaction-types: “[A]n analyst will
develop a model to show what contract term respecting damages would be efficient for a
particular transaction type.”). See also Todd D. Rakoff, Social Structure, Legal Structure, and
Default Rules: A Comment, 3 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L. J. 19, 22 (1993) (noting that the
construction of legal categories is partially an adoption of roles and transactions defined by
society).
194 The common law concepts of anticipatory repudiation and adequate assurance are
found in the Chinese Contract Law; also, the People’s Supreme Court implemented a system
of “Guiding Cases” to assist lower courts in the application of Chinese law.
195 See Availability of Specific Remedies, supra note 20, at 168-69.
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decisions), dating back to the pre-Qin dynasty (before 221 B.C.).196 The
empirical study has shown that Chinese courts’ SP orders coalesce around a
number of common rationales. This results in similar case outcomes as found
in a case-based common law.197 Additionally, today’s Guiding Case system
established by the SPC has historical precedence. Dong Zhongshu also
created hypothetical or model panwen system (Chunqiu Jueyu practice)
during the Han Dynasty (206 B.C.-208 A.D.), which can be seen as the
precursor to the Chinese SPC’s practice of issuing Guiding Opinions.198 The
model or guiding cases are applied to decide real cases in order to bring
consistency and objectivity to the legal order.
The frugality of Chinese courts in issuing SP orders may indicate that
the efficiency of SP is a concern. The supervision or transaction costs of SP,
depending on the nature of the performance being compelled, often are
viewed as substantially higher than the awarding of damages. The survey
showed that the concern over higher costs of enforcement was an important
but not controlling factor in court decisions on whether to issue SP. The
competing factors include fairness, good faith, and reasonableness. Although
these countervailing factors are not suggested in the formal law, especially
in cases where the claimant asks for SP, the courts police the use of SP. The
law states that it is the aggrieved party that selects the choice between
damages and SP. In fact, the decision to order SP is a combination of party
and judicial choice. For example, if the non-performing party elects not to
cover by buying substituted goods and then demands SP, a court may see this
as a violation of the party’s duty to mitigate damages. Generally, requests for
SP may be deemed to be unreasonable or an act of bad faith depending on
the factual scenario and type of contract in dispute. The evidence shows that
Chinese courts are familiar with other court rulings in this area and follow a
widely accepted taxonomy of contract approach in deciding to issue SP.
VII. CONCLUSION
This article employs statistical data analysis and qualitative interviews
of Chinese judges to investigate the theoretical foundation and practical
application of SP in China as a contractual remedy in civil and commercial
196 Norman P. Ho, Confucian Jurisprudence in Practice: Pre-Tang Dynasty Panwen
(Written Legal Judgments), 22 PAC. RIM L. & POL’Y J., 49, 55-56 (2013).
197 The panwen system recognized the importance of the rule of law that similar decisions
and punishments should be prescribed for similar fact situations. The panwen system, which
came into full force during the Han dynasty (206 B.C. – 208 A.D.), was based on the
application of principles to factual scenarios; analysis of context; and analogical reasoning
from previously espoused panwen judgments. See DiMatteo, supra note 124 at 395 (citing Ho,
supra note 197, at 78-79).
198 See Jialue “Charles” Li, China, A Sui Generis Case for the Western Rule-of-Law Model,
41 GEO. J. INT’L L. 711, 737-38 (2010) (discussing precedent in the Han and subsequent
dynasties and noting that Western scholars often ignore the role of precedent in ancient China).
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disputes across the three levels of the Chinese court system. The findings
indicate that: (1) the awards of SP as a remedy are less frequent than
commonly assumed; (2) judges in the Chinese court system take a proactive
role in the preliminary stages of a trial and actively persuade the aggrieved
party to accept damages rather than seek an order of SP; (3) lower courts are
more likely to order SP, but at the same time the breaching parties at that
level of the court system are more likely to settle for damages; and (4)
concern for supervision costs associated with SP is not a determining or
predictive factor of the courts’ reasoning on whether or not to grant SP.
First, the findings show that despite the view of SP has an ordinary
remedy, Chinese courts seek efficiency by ensuring that the aggrieved party’s
interests are not overprotected. They have done this by imposing a number
of restrictions on the availability of SP. The restrictions are broadly worded
and can be used to offset a plaintiff’s claim for SP. Damages are awarded
when SP is impossible, impractical or excessive, or when the aggrieved party
does not make a claim for SP within a reasonable period of time. This limiting
language indicates that the courts see the giving of damages as the preferred
remedy and SP as an extraordinary remedy. The abstract phraseology of
impractical and excessive gives the courts a great deal of discretion in dealing
with claims for SP. Furthermore, a claim that is well within the limitation
period (statute of limitations) may be rejected as untimely within the
“reasonable period of time” standard relating to SP.199
There seems little practical difference between the applications of SP in
the common law world as compared to the civil law system in China.200
Demands for SP orders are usually only granted in situations where a
common law court would do the same.201 This does not imply that there is no
longer any divergence between Chinese law and common law on the
prioritization of the remedies of damages and SP.
Second, judges will, before the court hearing, determine the probability
of issuing a SP order in any given case by weighing the benefits to the
aggrieved party and general public, against the difficulties of enforcement.
Usually, the more experienced judges will exercise the power of persuasion
to encourage an aggrieved party to change its claim from SP to damages.
Third, even if there is a good chance that the court would order SP, the
aggrieved party might want to avoid the risk of expensive and lengthy
proceedings. The cost of litigation may be high due to legal fees, and it may
be time-consuming to convince the court to issue a SP order. Also, there is a
great deal of uncertainty in the enforcement of SP orders. The effectiveness
of the enforcement of court decisions has long been regarded as notoriously
deficient in China.202There are also costs and risks on the side of the
199
200
201
202
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defendant. In some instances the plausible threat of SP may encourage the
defendant to seek a settlement for the payment of damages.
Finally, from the court’s perspective, if the process of enforcement is
likely to be difficult and unduly lengthy, there is a high probability that a
court would decline to issue a SP order. However, the greater preference for
damages awards in the High Courts in China is not replicated in the lower
courts. Trial Court judges are focused on not being overturned by appellate
courts and less concerned about enforcement costs. This is due to personal
considerations since being overturned affects the Trial judges’ performance
rating. Furthermore, enforcement of SP orders is the responsibility of the
enforcement division of the court and not the court that issued the order.
The empirical study presented in this article on the use of SP in the
Chinese court system provides support for the proposition that the divergence
between the civil and common law views of SP as an ordinary or
extraordinary remedy is not as wide as depicted in the formal law. It is also
the case that Chinese law has been influenced by a common-law-like view of
case law. The study makes clear that the labeling of SP as an ordinary or
extraordinary remedy is not reflected in Chinese court practice. Chinese
courts are influenced by a recognized taxonomy of contracts in determining
which types of contracts are deserving of SP. In fact, Chinese courts’
frugality in the issuance of SP orders bring them closer to the approach taken
in the common law.

of Civil Judgments, 10 COLUM. J. ASIAN L. 1 (1996). (arguing the enforceability problem is
sometimes due to the Communist party intervening into judicial decisions) id 50. Another
problem can be characterized as the lack of finality of judicial decisions: “Although the
judgment of the trial in second instance is supposed to be the final judgment and thus
enforceable (‘legally effective’), defendants in fact have numerous opportunities to relitigate
the merits of the case, or at least to pose further procedural obstacles in the way of execution.”
Id. at 38. See also Xin He, Enforcing Commercial Judgments in the Pearl River Delta of
China, 57 AM. J. COMP. L. 419 (2009).

332

